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This thesis focuses on three aspects (i.e., role-based access control, role-based delegation and
privacy-aware access control) of developing a systematic methodology for information shar-
ing in distributed collaborative environments. We develop techniques for setting up secure
group communication and providing accesses to group members for many database systems,
which incorporate new security constrains and policies raised by current information tech-
nologies. We create new forms of access control models to identify and address issues of
sharing information in collaborative environments and to specify and enforce privacy pro-
tection rules to support identified issues.
In role based access control systems (RBAC) permissions are associated with roles, and
users are made members of appropriate roles thereby acquiring the roles’ permissions. This
greatly simplifies management of permissions. Roles are created for various job functions
in an organization and users are assigned roles based on their responsibilities and qualifica-
tions. Users can be easily reassigned from one role to another. Roles can be granted new
permissions as new applications and systems are incorporated, and permissions can be re-
voked from roles as needed. The principal motivation of RBAC is to simplify administration.
In large organizations the number of roles can be in the hundreds or thousands, and users can
be in the tens or hundreds of thousands, maybe even millions. Effective management of
permission-role assignment could be very useful in practice to avoid the security breach, es-
pecially when conflicting permissions granted to the same role. Constraints are an important
aspect of RBAC and are a powerful mechanism for laying out higher level organizational pol-
icy. Even for the usage control (UCON) model, constraints are discussed less and no formal
language is proposed to describe constraints precisely. An appealing is to study constraints
formally in RBAC and UCON models. Our work looks at proposing formal approaches to
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check conflicts and help allocate permissions without compromising security in RBAC and
proposing a formal language to specify constraints for system designers and administrators
in UCON models.
Delegation requirement arises when a user needs to act on another’s behalf to access
resources. Essentially, in a multi-agent system, delegation becomes the primary mechanism
of inter-agent collaboration and cooperation. However, the previous delegation model could
not work efficiently in large systems and perform the sensitive delegation task within the
broad area of security. In this thesis, we introduce a flexible ability-based delegation model
within RBAC. Moreover, to avoid risk during the delegation process, we propose a secure
multi-level delegation model, where a projection between the reliability of delegatees and
the sensitivity of delegated tasks is built. Our multi-level delegation model allows that a
delegatee in a higher trust level can be assigned with a higher level task.
With the widespread use of information technology, privacy protection becomes a major
concern and it could not be easily achieved by traditional access control models. In this
thesis, we propose a privacy-aware access control model with generalization boundaries,
which could maximize data usability while, minimizing disclosure of privacy. Moreover,
our privacy-aware access control model provides a much finer level of control. Although
Hippocratic database enforced the fine-grained disclosure policy through creating a privacy
authorization table, but it does not allow to distinguish which particular method is used
for fulfilling a service in a real world case. We use a goal-oriented approach to analyze
privacy policies of the enterprises involved in a business process, in which one can determine
the minimum disclosure of data for fulfilling the root purpose with respect to customer’s
maximum trust. We provide efficient algorithms to automatically derive the optimal way of
authorizations needed to achieve a service from enterprise privacy policies.
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Collaborative systems, groupware, or multi-user applications allow groups of users to com-
municate and cooperate on common tasks. Example systems include a wide range of appli-
cations such as audio/video conferencing, collaborative document sharing/editing, distance
learning, workflow management systems, and so on. All of these systems contain infor-
mation and resources with different degrees of sensitivity. The applications deployed in
such systems create, manipulate, and provide access to a variety of protected information
and resources. Balancing the competing goals of collaboration and security is difficult be-
cause interaction in collaborative systems is targeted towards making people, all who need
it, whereas information security seeks to ensure the availability, confidentiality, and integrity
of these elements while providing it only to those with proper authorization. Protection of
contextual information and resources in such systems therefore entails addressing several
requirements not raised by traditional single-user environments, due in part to the unpre-
dictability of users and the unexpected manners in which users and applications interact in
collaborative sessions. Among the several areas of security under consideration for collabo-
rative environments, authorization or access control is particularly important.
Role-based access control (RBAC) is a technology that is attracting a great deal of at-
tention, particularly for commercial applications, because of its potential for reducing the
complexity and cost of security administration in large networked applications. Over the
past decade, interest in RBAC has increased dramatically. In the late 1980s and early 1990s
researchers began recognizing the virtues of roles as an abstraction for managing privileges
within applications and database management systems. A role was seen as a job or position
14
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within an organization. A role exists as a structure separate from that of the users who were
assigned to the roles. Dobson and McDermid [33] used the term functional roles. Baldwin
[10] called these structures named protection domains (NPDs) and stated that they could be
related and organized into hierarchies based on NPD permission subsets. Also recognized
was the use of roles in support of the principle of least privilege in which a role is created
with minimum permissions in specification of duty requirements [95]. The Brewer and Nash
model [12] presented a basic theory for use in implementing dynamically changing access
permissions. The model is described in terms of a particular commercial security policy,
known as the Chinese wall. The model is developed by first defining what a Chinese wall
means and then defining a set of rules (SoD requirements) such that no user can ever access
data from the wrong side of the wall. Nash and Poland [72] discussed the application of
role-based security to cryptographic authentication devices commonly used in the banking
industry.
Bell and LaPadula [11] formalized military access control rules into a mathematical
model suitable for defining and evaluating computer security systems. As formulated in this
model, multilevel secure systems implement the familiar government document classifica-
tion rule: Users are only allowed to access information that is classified at or below their own
clearance level. Conceptually, this is a very simple policy, readily understood and followed
by humans. In 1994, Nyanchama and Osborn [73] proposed a very generalized form of role
organization called a role graph model. The authors showed that roles could be organized
based on three role relationships: partial, shared, and augmented privileges. The role graph
model is particularly useful in analyzing privilege sharing, which is critical in detecting and
preventing conflict of interest relationships between roles. In 1996, Sandhu and colleagues
[84] introduced a framework of RBAC models, called RBAC96. Since then, the concept of
RBAC becomes a widely deployed and highly successful alternative to conventional discre-
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
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tionary and mandatory access controls [1, 35, 36]. The principal idea in RBAC is that users
and permissions are assigned to roles. Users acquire permissions indirectly via roles. This
remarkably simple idea has many benefits and elaborations. Administration of authorization
is much simplified in RBAC. Separation of user-role assignment and permission-role assign-
ment facilitates different business processes and administrators for these tasks. Modifications
to the permissions of a role immediately apply to all users in the role. Users are easily deas-
signed and assigned roles as their job functions and responsibilities change. There are two
major elaborations of the simple RBAC concept. One elaboration is to have hierarchical
roles, and another elaboration is to have separation of duty and other constraints.
In RBAC, a user is a human being or an autonomous agent, a role is a collection of
permissions needed to perform a certain job function within an organization, a permission is
an access mode that can be exercised on objects in the system, and a session relates a user to
possibly many roles. When a user logs in the system he establishes a session and, during this
session, he can request activation of some of the roles he is authorized to play. An activation
request is granted only if the corresponding role is enabled at the time of the request and
the user requesting the activation is entitled to activate the role at the time of the request.
If an activation request is satisfied, the user issuing the request obtains all the permissions
associated with the role he has requested to activate. On the sets Users, Roles, Permissions,
and Sessions, several functions are defined. The user assignment (UA) and the permission
assignment (PA) functions model the assignment of users to roles and the assignment of
permissions to roles, respectively. A user can be authorized to play many roles, and many
users can be authorized to play the same role. Moreover, a role can have many permissions,
and the same permissions can be associated with many roles. The user function maps each
session to a single user, whereas the function role establishes a mapping between a session
and a set of roles (i.e., the roles that are activated by the corresponding user in that session).
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
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On Roles, a hierarchy is defined, denoted by . If ri  rj , ri; rj 2 Roles, then role ri
inherits the permissions of role rj . The RBAC model consists of the following components.
 sets Users , Roles , Permissions , and Sessions , representing the set of users, roles, per-
missions, and sessions, respectively;
 PA: Roles !Permissions, the permission assignment function, that assigns to roles the
permissions needed to complete their jobs;
 UA: Users !Roles, the user assignment function, that assigns users to roles;
 user: Sessions ! Users, that assigns each session to a single user;
 role: Sessions  ! 2Roles, that assigns each session to a set of roles; and
 RH  Roles  Roles, a partially ordered role hierarchy (written ).
RBAC is policy-neutral and flexible. The policy that is enforced is a consequence of
the detailed configuration of various RBAC components. RBAC’s flexibility allows a wide
range of policies to be implemented. Examples of this flexibility to support different policies
can be found in [34, 86, 104]. In access control systems, the number of roles and users and
permissions associated to roles in a large enterprise system can be hundreds or thousands.
Managing these roles, users, permissions and their interrelationships is a vital challenge that
is often highly decentralized and delegated to a small team of project groups. RBAC allows
us to model security from the perspective of the organization, because we can align security
modeling to the roles and responsibilities in the organization. Most large organizations have
some business rules related to access control policy such as need-to-know, separation of
duty, rotation of sensitive job positions, and so on. Delegation of authority is an important
method to implement the rules. The delegation requirement arises when a user needs to
act on another user’s behalf to access resources. The basic idea behind delegation is that
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
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some active entity in a system delegates authority to another active entity to carry out some
functions on behalf of the former.
A number of models dealing with various aspects of delegation have been published
[14, 118, 36, 76]. RBDM0 [7, 8] is the first delegation model based on role. RBDM deals
with a flat and hierarchical role, multi-step delegation, in particular, which is user-to-user
delegation primarily based on roles. L. Zhang et al [117] presented a rule-based delegation
model called RDM2000. Their model supports the specification of delegation authoriza-
tion rules to impose restrictions on which roles can be delegated to whom. X. Zhang et
al [114] proposed a permission-based delegation model called PBDM, which supports both
role and permission level delegation. Their model controls delegation operations through
the notion of delegatable roles such that only permissions assigned to these roles can be del-
egated to others. Furthermore, Wang et al. [100] proposed a role-based delegation model
which support user-to-group delegation. In [30], Crampton and Khambhammettu proposed
a delegation model that supports both grant and transfer. Atluri andWarner [6] studied how
to support delegation in workflow systems. They extended the notion of delegation to allow
conditional delegation, where conditions can be based on time, workload and task attributes.
One may specify rules to determine under what condition a delegation operation should be
performed. Role-based delegation based on role-based access control (RBAC) has proven to
be a flexible and useful access control for information sharing in a distributed collaborative
environment [102].
In recent years, there have been several attempts to extend access-control models be-
yond the basic access matrix model of Lampson, which has dominated this area for over
three decades. The concept of UCON was recently introduced in the literature by Park and
Sandhu as a fundamental enhancement of the access matrix [83]. The UCON model pro-
vides a comprehensive framework for the next-generation access control. A UCON system
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
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consists of six components: subjects and their attributes, objects and their attributes, rights,
authorizations, obligations, and conditions. The authorizations, obligations, and conditions
are the components of the UCON decisions. UCON extends the traditional access-control
models in one aspect, in that the control decision depends not only on authorizations, but
also on obligations and conditions. Obligations are activities that are performed by the sub-
jects or by the system. For example, playing a licensed music file requires a user to click an
advertisement and register in the authors web page. Such an action can be required before
or during the playing process. Conditions are system and environmental restrictions that
are not directly related to subject or object attributes, such as the system clock, the location,
system load, system mode, etc. Another way in which UCON extends traditional access con-
trol models is the concepts of continuity and mutability. A complete usage process consists
of three phases through time: before usage, ongoing usage, and after usage. The control-
decision components are checked and enforced in the first two phases, named pre-decisions
and ongoing decisions, respectively. The presence of ongoing decisions is called continuity.
Mutability means that the subject or object attribute value may be updated to a new value
as a result of accessing. Along with the three phases, there are three kinds of updates: pre-
updates, ongoing updates, and post-updates. All these updates are performed and monitored
by the security system as the access is being attempted by the subject to the object. Changing
subject and object attributes has an impact on other ongoing or future usage of permissions
involving this subject or object. This aspect of mutability makes UCON very powerful. The
new expressive power brought in by UCON is very germane to the automated and seamless
security administration required in environments.
As the internet becomes one of the most important infrastructures for modern societies,
systems need efficient access control policies in order to effectively protect system security
and privacy. This reflects the growing attention of customers to their personal information
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and the increasing number of laws, policies, and regulations that are intended to safeguard
it. By demonstrating good privacy practices, many enterprises try to utilize information
analysis and knowledge extraction to provide better services to individuals without violating
individual privacy. As privacy becomes a major concern for both consumers and enterprises,
much research effort has been devoted to the development of privacy protecting technology
[2, 3, 5, 56]. As an important step for helping users to gain control over the use of their
personal information, the W3C has proposed the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P)
[121]. P3P allows websites to encode their privacy practice, such as what information is
collected, who can access the data for what purposes, and how long the data will be stored
by the sites, in a machine-readable format. Even though P3P provides a standard means for
enterprises to make privacy promises to their users, P3P does not provide any mechanism to
ensure that these promises are consistent with the internal data processing.
The Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL) [119] proposed by IBM is a for-
mal language for writing enterprise privacy policies to govern data handling practices in IT
systems. An EPAL policy defines lists of hierarchies of data-categories, user-categories, and
purposes. User-categories are the entities (users/groups) that use collected data, and data-
categories define different categories of collected data that are handled differently from a
privacy perspective. Purposes model the services for which data is intended to be used. An
EPAL policy also defines sets of actions, obligations, and conditions. Actions model how
the data is used, and obligations define actions that must be taken by the environment of
EPAL. Lastly, conditions are boolean expressions that evaluate the context. Privacy autho-
rization rules are defined using these elements, and each rule allows or denies actions on
data-categories by user-categories for certain purposes under certain conditions while man-
dating certain obligations.
The concept of Hippocratic databases, incorporating privacy protection within relational
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database systems, was introduced by Agrawal et al. [3]. The proposed architecture uses pri-
vacy metadata, which consist of privacy policies and privacy authorizations stored in two ta-
bles. A privacy policy defines for each attribute of a table the usage purpose(s), the external-
recipients and retention period, while privacy authorization defines which purposes each user
is authorized to use. Recently, Lefevre et al. [56] presented an approach to enforcing privacy
policy in database environments. Their work focuses on ensuring limited data disclosure,
based on the premise that data providers have control over who is allowed to see their per-
sonal data and for what purpose. Rabitti et al. [80] developed a comprehensive authorization
model designed for next-generation database systems. The data models considered in their
work support object-oriented concepts and incorporate some key semantic data modeling
concepts such as composite objects and versions. Furthermore, they formalize and develop
clear semantics for various types of authorizations such as strong/weak and negative/positive
authorizations. A number of key issues that arise in implementing such a model are also
discussed in their work.
In this thesis we would like to explore how to invent new forms of access control models
to enhance the privacy protection aspect of current information technology.
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT
RBAC has many components, thereby making RBAC administration multi-faceted. In par-
ticular we can separate issues of assigning users to roles, assigning permissions to roles, and
assigning roles to roles to define a role hierarchy. These activities are all required to bring
users and permissions together. In large enterprise-wide systems the number of roles can be
in the hundreds or thousands, and users can be in the tens or hundreds of thousands, maybe
even millions. Managing these roles and users, and their interrelationships is a formidable
task. It is very difficult to maintain consistency because it may change the authorization
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level, or imply high-level confidential information when more than one permission is re-
quested and granted. Specifically, conflicts arise when assigning permissions to roles with
different memberships. We believe that substantial advances in RBAC can be further made
by reconsidering the foundational principles.
In a multi-agent system, delegation is the primary mechanism of inter-agent collabora-
tion and cooperation. The basic idea behind delegation is that some active entity in a system
delegates authority to another active entity to carry out some functions on behalf of the for-
mer. Essentially, a delegation operation could temporarily change the access control state so
as to allow an agent to use another agent’s access privileges. Due to its effect on the access
control state, delegation may lead to a violation of security policies. More precisely, infor-
mation breaching may happen even during the delegation phase. In an open environment, the
entities are customarily alien to each other. When entering into a delegation, the delegator is
entering into an uncertain interaction in which there is a risk of failure due to the delegation
decisions. We are interested in developing a secure delegation model that can be recognized
as a very useful component of access control systems.
Usage control (UCON) model is considered as the next generation access control model.
In UCON, authorizations, obligations and conditions are decision factors employed by the
usage decision functions to determine wether a subject should be allowed to access an object
with a particular right. In addition to these factors, modern information system also includes
another two important properties called “continuity” and “mutability”. Constraints as one of
the most important components have involved in the principle motivations of usage analysis
and design, however, there is not much work addressing this issue. It is necessary to provide
a formal language to precisely describe constraints of UCON.
While current information technology enables people to carry out their business virtu-
ally at any time in any place, privacy issues are exacerbated when personal information is
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collected, stored and used in various information systems. Privacy protection has become a
critical issue in the development of information systems. We emphasize that privacy protec-
tion cannot be easily achieved by traditional access control models. The first reason is that
while traditional access control models focus on which user is performing which action on
which data object, privacy policies are concerned with which data object is used for which
purpose(s). Another difficulty of privacy protection is that the comfort level of data usage
varies from individual to individual. We believe that the availability of new generation access
control mechanisms is an important requirement of a comprehensive solution to privacy.
1.2 METHODOLOGY
Permission-role assignment is an important issue in role-based access control (RBAC). There
are two types of problems that may arise in permission-role assignment. One is related to
the authorization granting process in that conflicting permissions may be granted to a role
and, as a result, users with the role may have or derive a high level of authority. The other is
related to authorization revocation. When a permission is revoked from a role, the role may
still have the permission from other roles. To solve these problems, we discuss granting and
revocation models related to mobile and immobile memberships between permissions and
roles, and propose authorization granting algorithms to check conflicts and help allocate the
permissions without compromising security. Moreover, the new revocation models, local and
global revocation, are well studied. The revocation algorithms based on relational algebra
and operations provide a rich variety.
Delegation requirement arises when a user needs to act on another user’s behalf to access
resources. In todays highly dynamic distributed systems, collaboration is necessary for infor-
mation sharing with others, so a user may want to delegate a collection of permissions, named
an ability, to another user or all members of a group. Further, delegation is a mechanism that
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allows one agent to act on another’s privilege. It is important that the privileges should be
delegated to a person who is trustworthy. Based on this fact, we build a new ability-based
delegation model (ABDM) and develop its delegation algorithm. The framework include
both ability-based user-user delegation and user-group delegation. Also, in order to assess
how trustworthy a delegatee is, we devise trust evaluation techniques to describe a delega-
tee’s trust history and predict the future trend of trust. We perform an in-depth study on how
to manage a delegation in a secure manner and develop a secure delegation model by taking
trust into account.
Constraints are an important aspect of RBAC and are a powerful mechanism for laying
out higher level organizational policy. Even for the usage control (UCON) model, constraints
are discussed less and no formal language is proposed to describe constraints precisely. An
appealing is to study constraints formally in UCON models. Therefore, we specify con-
straints of the UCON model with object constraints language (OCL). With OCL, we provide
a tool to precisely describe constraints for system designers and administrators. The specifi-
cation also provides the precise meaning of the new features of UCON, such as the mutability
of attributes and the continuity of usage control decisions.
To ease privacy concerns, many important mechanisms are proposed to guarantee the
respect of privacy principles in data management. However, the issues like purpose hierar-
chies, task delegations and minimal privacy cost are missing from the proposed mechanisms.
We extend these mechanisms in order to support inter-organizational business processes. In
particular, we organize purposes into purpose directed graphs through AND/OR decompo-
sitions, which support the delegation of tasks and authorizations when a host of partners
participating in the business service provides different ways to achieve the same service.
Specially, customers have control of deciding how to get a service fulfilled on the basis of
their personal feeling of trust for any service customization. Quantitative analysis is per-
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formed to characterize privacy penalties dealing with privacy cost and customer’s trust.
1.3 CONTRIBUTIONS
Information sharing on distributed collaboration usually occurs in broad, highly dynamic
network-based environments, and formally accessing the resources in a secure manner poses
a difficult and vital challenge. My PhD research focuses exclusively on how to specify and
enforce policies for information sharing in distributed collaborative environments based on
three main contributions.
The first main contribution of this research is to extend the current research in role-
based access control and usage control models. We provide new authorization allocation
algorithms for RBAC along with mobility that is based on relational algebra operations.
The authorization granting algorithm, local and global revocation algorithm defined in this
section can automatically check conflicts when granting more than one permission as mobile
or immobile member to a role in the system. In the UCON model, we analyze various kinds
of constraints represented with object constraint language such as decision actor constraints
and mutability constraints etc. We also provide a tool to precisely describe constraints for
system designers and administrators and show the flexibility and expressive capability of this
model by specifying the core models of UCON with extensive examples.
The second contribution is improving the delegation models by integrating new tech-
niques to develop efficient algorithms and build efficient delegation frameworks. We pro-
posed a flexible ability-based delegation model by extending user to group and permission
to ability. We develop delegation algorithms and analyze the delegating framework includ-
ing delegating authorization and revocation with constraints on an ability-based delegation.
Moreover, the multi-level delegation model proposed in this work allows that a delegatee
in a higher trust level can be assigned with a higher level of task. The delegation task lev-
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els are classified according to information sensitivity, while, the trust levels combine trust
values and trust trend together to indicate to what extent a delegatee is reliable or trustwor-
thy. The effectiveness of our proposed multi-level delegation model is investigated and the
experimental results confirm the advantages of our model in privacy protection.
The third contribution is to propose new mechanisms in privacy protecting systems for
enhancing current privacy methods with respect to balancing data privacy and usability. We
propose a privacy-aware access control model with generalization boundaries, which can
satisfy the requirements of both data providers and data users. Compared with traditional
access models, our model provides a much finer level of control as the access control decision
is based on the question of “how much information can be allowed for a certain user”, rather
than “is information allowed for a certain user or not”. Since purpose plays an important role
in order to capture the intended usage of information, we organize purposes in hierarchal
manner through AND/OR decomposition and use a goal-oriented approach to analyze the
privacy policies involved in a business process. We also provide efficient algorithms to
determine the optimal privacy-aware path for achieving a service. This allows the automatic
derive action of access control policies for an inter-organizational business process from the
collection of privacy policies associated with different participating enterprises.
1.4 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
Although role-based access control is the de facto access control model for collaborative
environment, not much work appears in studying the conflicts when assigning permissions
to roles with different memberships. In Chapter 2, we analyzes authorization granting and
revocation models with the mobility of permission-role relationships. With the increase of
the shared information and resources in the collaborative environment, unauthorized access
to the information by illegal users that leads to the leakage of the data also increases. For
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better performance, it is important to keep resources and the information integrity from the
unexpected use by unauthorized user. Therefore, delegation models were proposed as a sup-
port to the strong demand for the authentication and the access control of distributed-shared
resources. In the following two chapters, we extend the traditional delegation models to
meet different requirements of information sharing. Chapter 3 studies an flexible ability-
based delegation model in RBAC and develops delegation algorithms. Chapter 4 illustrates
multi-level delegations with trust management, where both delegation tasks and trust are or-
ganized into three levels. The proposed multi-level delegation model allows that a delegatee
in a higher trust level can be assigned with a higher level of task. Technological innovations
in computers and networks have enabled pervasive availability and usability of digital infor-
mation bringing us opportunities for new business models and personal life styles. Because
of these innovations, traditional access control models could not deal with new challenging
issues for reliable and trusted controls on the usages of digital resources. The usage control
model (UCON) was proposed as a comprehensive framework for the next generation access
control. In Chapter 5, we specifies the usage control model with object constraint language
and provides a tool to precisely describe constraints for system designers and administrators.
After the Internet becomes one of the most important infrastructures for modern societies,
and systems need efficient access control policy in order to effectively protect the system
security and privacy. In Chapter 6, we proposes a generalization boundary technique that
can satisfy the requirements of both data providers and data users. Moreover, we present a
privacy-aware access control model, where the trust-based decision policy and ongoing ac-
cess control policy combine together to create a secure protection system. Finally in Chapter
7, we organizes purposes in a hierarchal manner through AND/OR decomposition and intro-
duces how to find the optimal privacy-aware path in Hippocratic databases. The conclusion





In this chapter, we develop formal approaches to check the conflicts and therefore help allo-
cate the permissions without compromising security. We analyze authorization granting and
revocation models with the mobility of permission-role relationships. Our main contribution
in this chapter is relational algebra-based authorization granting and local, global revocation
algorithms. Furthermore, we include an applicable example to illustrate our algorithms. An-
other contribution is that our algorithms could check conflicts when granting more than one
permission as a mobile or immobile member to a role in the system. As far as we know, there
is no previous work addressing these issues for permission allocation and conflict detection
concerning mobile memberships.
The information in this chapter is based on a published paper [62].
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Role-based access control (RBAC) is a flexible and policy-neutral access control technology
and is a promising access control technology for the modern computing environment [14,
35, 45, 118]. In RBAC, permissions(each permission is a pair of objects and operations) are
associated with roles and users are assigned to appropriate roles thereby acquiring the role’s
permissions. As such, a user in RBAC is a human being. It can be easily reassigned from
one role to another. A role is a job function or job title and created for various job functions
in an organization and users are assigned roles based on responsibilities and qualifications.
28
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A permission is an approval of a particular mode of access to one or more objects. The
relationships between users and roles, and between roles and permissions are many-to-many
(i.e, a permission can be associated with one or more roles, and a role can be associated with
one or more permissions) as depicted in Figure 2.1. Roles can be granted new permissions as
new applications come on line and permissions can be revoked from roles as needed. Within
RBAC, users are not directly granted permission to perform operations on an individual
object, but permissions are associated with roles.
The RBAC model supports the specification of several aspects:
a. User/role associations    the constraints specifying user authorization to perform
roles;
b. Role hierarchies    the constraints specifying which role may inherit all of the per-
missions of another role;
c. Duty separation constraints    there are user/role associations indicating conflict of
interest;
c1. Static separated duty (SSD)    a constraint specifying that a user cannot be
authorized for two different roles;
c2. Dynamic separation duty (DSD)    a constraint specifying that a user can be
authorized for two different roles but cannot act simultaneously in both;
d. Cardinality    the maximum number of users allowed; i.e. how many users can be
authorized for any particular role (role cardinality); e.g., only one manager.
Significant developments have been made within RBAC. The NIST model of RBAC
[34] and Web implementation of RBAC incorporates an administrative tool that provides
rudimentary support for an RBAC database that stores information about user and permis-
sion role assignments and role hierarchies [36]. Nyanchama and Osborn [76] define a role
graph model that rigorously specifies operational semantics for manipulating role relations
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Figure 2.1: RBAC relationship
in the contexts of a role hierarchy. ARBAC97 builds on these previous attempts to construct
administrative models [87] over all aspects of the RBAC model. Sandhu and Munawer [88]
extends the ARBAC97 model by adding the concept of mobile and immobile permissions
for the first time in this area. In [88], the authors distinguished two kinds of membership
in a role. Immobile membership grants the role to have the permission, but does not make
that permission eligible for further role assignment. Mobile membership on the other hand,
covers both aspects.
However, there is a consistency problem when using RBAC management. For instance,
if there are hundreds of permissions and thousands of roles in a system, it is very difficult
to maintain consistency because it may change the authorization level, or imply high-level
confidential information when more then one permission is requested and granted. Specifi-
cally, [88] does not mention conflicts when assigning permissions to roles. Therefore, there
is no support to deal administrative role with regular roles, especially mobile and immobile
members.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2.2, we consider the mobility of
permission-role relationship and problems related to permission assignment and revocation.
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Figure 2.2: Administrative role and role relationships in a bank
The relational algebra-based authorization granting and revocation algorithms are given in
Section 2.3. In Section 2.4, we review an anonymity scalable electronic commerce payment
scheme and apply algorithms to this scheme. Comparisons with previous work are discussed
in Section 2.5. Finally, we summary this chapter in Section 2.6.
2.2 MOTIVATION AND PROBLEM DEFINITIONS
There are two kinds of membership between permissions and roles, namely mobile and im-
mobile [88]. Immobile membership grants the role the permission but does not make that
permission eligible for further role assignments. Mobile membership on the other hand cov-
ers both aspects which means the role has the permission and the permission also becomes
eligible for assignment to other roles by appropriate administrative roles.
The distinction between mobile and immobile membership can be very important in prac-
tice. Figure 2.2 shows the administrative and regular roles that exist in a bank department.
The permission-role assignment allows us to give BankSo the authority to take a permission
assigned to Manager and grant it to roles Teller, Auditor, and Bank. The idea is that each
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administrative role can delegate permissions of the senior role to more junior roles. While
this may be acceptable for most permissions of a senior role, it is likely that some permis-
sions are not suitable for such delegation. For instance in Figure 2.2, suppose ‘approving
a loan’ is a permission of the role Manger, which should only be executed by the Manger.
Consider the two kinds of membership between permissions and roles, if this permission
is assigned to the role Manger as a mobile member, it is possible that all the roles junior
to the Manger can hold this permission through permission-role assignment, which leads to
security breach. So this permission can only be assigned to Manager as immobile while the
others can be assigned as mobile.
This example demonstrates that situations with mobile and immobile relationship be-
tween permissions and roles can be very useful in practice to avoid the security breach.
Throughout the paper, we consider the following two problems that may arise in permission-
role assignment.
Authorization granting problem: Is a permission in conflict with the permissions
of a role when granting the permission to the role as a mobile or immobile member?
Authorization revocation problem: Has a permission with mobile or immobile
membership of a role been revoked from the role?
Conflicting permissions may be granted to a role in permission-role assignment. For
example, the permission for approving a loan in a bank and that of funding a loan are con-
flicting. These two permissions can not be assigned to a role at the same time. It is easy to
find conflicts between permissions when assigning permissions to a role in a small database
but it is hard to find them when there are thousands of permissions in a system. Moreover, it
is even more complicated if taking mobile and immobile permissions into account. Our aim
is to provide relational algebra algorithms to solve these problems and then automatically
check conflicts when assigning and revoking.
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PermName Oper Object ConfPerm
Approval approve cash / check Funding
Funding invest cash Approval
Audit audit record Teller
Teller transfer cash Audit
Table 2.1: Example of the relation PERM
For convenience, we recall some basic definitions in paper [104] with no further expla-
nation. Let D be a database with a set of relations REL and a set of attributes Attri. REL
includes PERM, ROLE-PERM and SEN-JUN etc. Attri includes attributes such as Role-
Name, PermName, Senior and Junior, etc.
PERM is a relation of PermName, Oper, Object and ConfPerm. Perm-Name is the pri-
mary key for the table and is the name of the permission in the system. Oper is the name
of the operation granted. It contains information about the object to which the operation is
granted. Object is the item that can be accessed by the operation, which may be a database,
a table, a view, an index or a database package. ConfPerm is a set of permissions that is con-
flicting with the PermName in the relation. For example, a staff member in a bank cannot
have permissions of approval and funding at the same time (as well as permissions of audit
and teller). The relation of PERM is expressed in Table 2.1.
SEN-JUN is a relation of roles in a system. SEN and JUN are the senior and junior of
the two roles, senior roles are shown at the top of the role hierarchies. Senior roles inherit
permissions from junior roles. For example, Table 2.2 expresses the SEN-JUN relationship
in Figure 2.2, and role ‘Manager’ is the senior role of role ‘Teller’ and inherits all permissions
of ‘Teller’.
ROLE-PERM is a relation between the ROLES and the PERM, listing what permissions
are granted to what roles. For example, in Table 2.3, permission ‘Approval’ is assigned to
role ‘Teller’ and the permission ‘Funding’ to role ‘Manager’.
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Table 2.3: Example of relation ROLE-PERM
Admin.role Prereq.condition Role Range
BankSO Manager^Teller [Auditor, Auditor]
BankSO Manager^Auditor [Teller, Teller]
Table 2.4: Example of can-assignp-M in Figure2.2
Admin.role Prereq.condition Role Range
BankSO Manager [Auditor, Audior]
BankSO Manager [Teller, Teller]
Table 2.5: Example of can-assignp-IM in Figure2.2
2.3 AUTHORIZATION GRANTING AND REVOCATION ALGO-
RITHMS
In this section, we provide granting and revocation algorithms based on relational algebra.
As discussed before, a permission’s membership in a role can be mobile or immobile, so
each role x is separated into two sub-roles Mx and IMx. Note that membership in Mx is
mobile whereas membership in IMx is immobile.
A role x0 has all permissions of a role x when x0 > x1. A permission p is an explicit
member of a role x if (p; x) 2 PA and p is an implicit member of a role x if for some role
x0 < x; (p; x0) 2 PA. Combining mobile and immobile membership with the notion of
explicit and implicit membership gives us four distinct kinds of role membership:
(1) Explicit mobile member EMx = fpj(p;Mx) 2 PAg
(2) Explicit immobile member EIMx=fpj(p; IMx) 2 PAg
(3) Implicit mobile member ImMx = fpj9x0 < x; (p;Mx0) 2 PAg
1x0 > x means role x0 is senior to x; x0 < x means role x0 is junior to x.
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Admin.role Prereq.condition Role Range
BankSO Bank [Bank, Manager]
Table 2.6: can-revokep-M in Figure2.2
Admin.role Prereq.condition Role Range
BankSO Bank [Bank, Bank]
Table 2.7: can-revokep-IM in Figure2.2
(4) Implicit immobile member ImIMx = fpj9x0 < x; (p; IMx0) 2 PAg
It is possible for a permission to have more than one kind of membership in a role at the
same time. Hence there is strict precedence among these four kinds of membership 2.
EMx > EIMx > ImMx > ImIMx
A prerequisite condition is evaluated for a permission p by interpreting role x to be true
if p 2 EMx_ (p 2 ImMx^ p =2 EIMx) and x to be true if p =2 EMx^ p =2 EIMx^ p =2
ImMx ^ p =2 ImIMx.
For a given set of roles R, let AR be a set of administrative roles and CR denote all pos-
sible prerequisite conditions that can be formed using the roles inR. Not every administrator
can assign a permission to a role. The following relations provide what permissions an ad-
ministrator can assign mobile members or immobile members with prerequisite conditions.
Can-assignp-M , used to assign the permission as mobile members, is a relation in
ARCR2R. While can-assignp-IM assigns the permission as immobile members. Table
2.4 and 2.5 show the example of these two relations. The meaning of (BankSO;Manager^
Teller; [Auditor; Auditor])  can-assignp-M is that BankSO can assign a permission
whose current membership satisfies the prerequisite condition Manager ^ Teller to role
Auditor as a mobile member. (BankSO;Manager; [Teller; Teller])  can-assignp-IM
2Even though a role can have multiple kinds of membership in a permission, at any time only one of those
is actually in effect.
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means that BankSO can assign a permission whose current membership satisfies the pre-
requisite conditionManager to role Teller as an immobile member. To identify a role range
within the role hierarchy, the following closed and open interval notation is used:
[x; y]=fr 2 Rjx  r ^ r  yg, (x; y]=fr 2 Rjx > r ^ r  yg
[x; y)=fr 2 Rjx  r ^ r > yg, (x; y) = fr 2 Rjx > r ^ r > yg
Suppose an administrator role (ADrole) wants to assign a permission pj to a role r with
a set of permissions P which may include mobile and immobile members. The permission
pj may be assigned as a mobile and immobile member if there is no conflict between pj
and the permissions in P . We analyze both mobile and immobile members in the following
algorithm, which deals with whether the ADrole can assign the permission pj to r with no
conflicts. In algorithm 1, P  is the extension of P , which includes the explicit and implicit
members of P ; i.e., P  = fpjp 2 Pg [ fpj8r0 < r; (p; r0) 2 PAg.
Algorithm 1 provides a way to check whether or not a permission can be assigned as
mobile or immobile member to a role. It can prevent conflicts when assigning a permission
to a role with mobile or immobile memberships as well. After considering the authorization,
we consider the revocation of permission-role membership.
In the revocation model, a prerequisite condition is evaluated for a permission p by in-
terpreting role x to be true if p 2 EMx _ p 2 EIMx _ p 2 ImMx _ p 2 ImIMx and x
to be true if p =2 EMx ^ p =2 EIMx ^ x =2 ImMx ^ p =2 ImIMx. Permission-role revo-
cation of mobile and immobile memberships are authorized by the relations can-revokep-
M  AR CR 2R and can-revokep-IM  AR CR 2R respectively.
(BankSO;Manager; [Bank;Manager))  can-revokep-M in Table 2.6 means that
BankSO can revoke the mobile membership of a permission from any role in [Bank;Manager)
which satisfies the revoke prerequisite condition Bank. Similarly, the can-revokep-IM in
Table 2.7 refers to revoking the immobile membership.
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Algorithm 1: Authorization granting algorithm; Grantp(ADrole, r, pj).
Input: ADrole, role r and a permission pj
Output: true if ADrole can assign pj to r with no conflicts; false otherwise
Step 1. /*whether the ADrole can assign the permission pj to r or not*/
Let SM1 = prereq:condition(admin:role=ADrole(can-assignp-M )),
SIM1 = prereq:condition(admin:role=ADrole(can-assignp-IM )),
and R = Rolename(Permname=pj (ROLE-PERM ))
Suppose pj is a mobile member of the role r.
If S1 = SM1 \R 6= ;, there exists a role r1 2 S1, such that (pj ; r1) 2 PA and
r1 2 prereq:condition(admin:role=ADrole(can-assignp-M ))
Go to Step 2;
Suppose pj is a immobile member of the role r.
If S2 = SIM1 \R 6= ;, there exists a role r2 2 S2, such that (pj ; r2) 2 PA and
r2 2 prereq:condition(admin:role=ADrole(can-assignp-IM ))
Go to Step 2;
else
return false and stop
Step 2. /* whether the permission pj is conflicting with permissions of r or not*/
Let ConfPermS = ConfPerm(PermName=pj (PERM))




Before giving out our revocation algorithms, first we introduce the concept of local and
global revocation [101]. Local revocation only happens to the explicit relationship between
permissions and roles, while global revocation effects all other roles which are junior to the
role with the revoked permission. For local revocation, the permission is revoked only if
the permission is an explicit member of the role. For example in Figure 2.3, the role r1 still
has the permission p which has been locally revoked since the role is senior to role r2 and
r3 which are associated with the permission p. Therefore, local revocation from a role has
no effect when a permission is an implicit member of the role. However, global revocation
requires revocation of both explicit memberships and implicit memberships. If we globally
revoke permission p from the role r1, all the relationships between the permission p and
roles junior to r1 are revoked (see Figure 2.4). Global revocation therefore has a cascading
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Figure 2.4: Global revocation
effect downwards in the role hierarchy. Global revocation of a permission’s mobile and
immobile membership from role r requires that the permission be removed not only from the
explicit mobile and immobile membership in r, but also from explicit and implicit mobile
and immobile membership in all roles junior to r.
Algorithms 2 and 3 are used to revoke permission pj 2 P from a role r by ADrole, where
P is the set of permissions which have been assigned to the role r. Algorithm 2 can be used
revoke explicit mobile and immobile memberships, while Algorithm 3 can revoke explicit
and implicit mobile and immobile members. It should be noted that the global revocation
algorithm does not work if ADrole has no right to revoke pj from any role in Jun.
2.4 APPLYING THE RELATIONAL ALGEBRA ALGORITHMS
In this section, we apply the new relational algebra algorithms to a consumer anonymity
scalable payment scheme. We first briefly introduce the payment scheme and consider the
relationships of the roles in the scheme, and then analyze applications of our relational alge-
bra algorithms.
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Algorithm 2: Local Revocation Algorithm; Local-revoke(ADrole, r, pj).
Input: ADrole, role r and a permission pj
Output: true if ADrole can locally revoke pj from r; false otherwise
Step 1. If pj =2 fpj(p; r) 2 PAg
return false and stop.
/*there is no effect with the operation of the local revocation since the perm-
ission Pj is not an explicit member of the role r*/
else Go to Step 2. /*pj is an explicit member of r*/
Step 2. /*whether the ADrole can revoke the permission pj from r or not*/
Let RoleRange1 = RoleRange(admin:role=ADrole(can-revokep-M )),
RoleRange2 = RoleRange(admin:role=ADrole(can-revokep-IM ))
and Roleswithpj = RoleName(PerName=pj (ROLE-PERM )).
Suppose r 2 EMpj
If r 2 RoleRange1 \Roleswithpj 6= ;; /*r is in the role range to be revoked
by ADrole in can-revokep-M and the mobile membership with Pj*/
return true;
Suppose r 2 EIMpj
If r 2 RoleRange2 \Roleswithpj 6= ;; /*r is in the role range to be revoked
by ADrole in can-revokep-IM and the immobile membership with Pj*/
return true;
else
return false and stop. /*ADrole has no right to revoke the permission Pj
from the role r*/
2.4.1 THE ANONYMITY SCALABLE ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SCHEME
The payment scheme provides different degrees of anonymity for consumers. Consumers
can decide the levels of anonymity. They can have a low level of anonymity if they want to
spend coins directly after withdrawing them from the bank. Consumers can achieve a high
level of anonymity through an anonymity provider (AP) agent without revealing their private
information and are secure in relation to the bank because the new certificate of a coin comes
from the AP agent who is not involved in the payment process.
Electronic cash has sparked wide interest among cryptographers [40, 79]. In its simplest
form, an e-cash system consists of three parts (a bank, a consumer and a shop) and three
main procedures (withdrawal, payment and deposit). Besides the basic participants, a third
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Algorithm 3: Global Revocation Algorithm; Global-revoke(ADrole, r, pj).
Input: ADrole, role r and a permission pj
Output: true if ADrole can globally revoke pj from r; false otherwise
Begin. If pj =2 P 
return false; /*there is no effect with the operation of the local revocation
since pj is not an explicit and implicit member of r*/
else
(1) If pj 2 P is a mobile member of the role and r 2 EMpj ,
Local-revoke(ADrole, r, pj); /*pj is locally revoked as a mobile member*/
If pj 2 P is an immobile member of the role and r 2 EIMpj ,
Local-revoke(ADrole, r, pj); /*pj is locally revoked as an immobile member*/
(2) Suppose Jun = junior(Senior=r(SEN -JUN ))
For all y 2 Jun with mobile membership with the permission
Local-revoke(ADrole, y, pj) as y 2 EMpj ;
For all y 2 Jun with immobile membership with the permission
Local-revoke(ADrole, y, pj) as y 2 EIMpj ;
/*Pj is locally revoked from all such y 2 Jun*/




party named anonymity provider (AP) agent is involved in the scheme. The AP agent helps
the consumer to get the required anonymity but is not involved in the purchase process. The
model is shown in Figure 2.5. The AP agent gives a certificate to the consumer when he/she
needs a high level of anonymity.
From the viewpoint of banks, consumers can improve anonymity if they are worried
about disclosure of their identities. This is a practical payment scheme for internet purchases
because it has provided a solution with different anonymity requirements for consumers.
However, consumers cannot get the required level of anonymity if the role BANK and AP
are assigned to one user. It shows the management importance of the payment scheme. To
simplify the management, we analyze its management with the relational algebra algorithms.
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Table 2.9: ROLE-PERM relation
2.4.2 APPLYING THE AUTHORIZATION GRANTING ALGORITHM
Due to the length limit, we only include an application of the authorization granting algo-
rithm. A hierarchy of roles and a hierarchy of administrative roles are show in Figure 2.6
and 2.7 respectively, we define the can-assignp-M in Table 2.10. Here, we only show the
process of assigning a permission to a role as a mobile member.
Here, we only analyze NSSO tuples in Table 2.10 (the analysis for APSO, BankSO and
ShopSO are similar). The first tuple authorizes NSSO to assign permissions whose current
membership satisfies the prerequisite condition role DIR to roleM1 in the AP agent as mobile
members. The second and third tuples authorize NSSO to assign permissions whose current
membership satisfies the prerequisite condition role DIR to role M2 and M3 respectively as
mobile members. Table 2.9 shows parts of the relations between permissions and roles in
the scheme. Assume the role FPS with permission set P = fApprovalg and P  = P =
fApprovalg. The administrative role NSSO wants to assign the permission Teller to the
role FPS as a mobile member. Using the first step of the granting algorithm Grantp(NSSO,
FPS, Teller), we could get:
S = prereq:condition(admin:role=NSSO(can-assignp-M)) = fDIRg and
R = Rolename(Permname=Teller(ROLE-PERM)) = fDIR;Bankg;
Since R
T
S = fDIRg 6= ;, NSSO can assign permission Teller to the role FPS as a
mobile member. Applying the second step based on Table 2.1, we could get:
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The Manager inherits the Operator
and Quality controler.They are
employees
Bank:
The Manager inherits the TELLER,
Auditor and Account-rep, they are employees.
The Account-rep has DSD relationships
Shop:
The Manager inherits the Saler and the Auditor,
They are employees. The saler has
DSD relationship with Auditor
with the Teller, SSD relationship with the Auditor
Figure 2.6: User-role assignment in the payment scheme
ConfPermS=ConfPerm (PermName=Teller(PERM)) = fAuditg and
ConfPermS \ P  = ;.
Hence there are no conflicts when assigning permission Teller to the role FPS as a
mobile member.
2.4.3 APPLICATION OF THE AUTHORIZATION REVOCATION ALGORITHM
Tables 2.11 and 2.2 give the can-revokep-M and a part of senior-junior relationship of
payment scheme.
Based on the Table 2.9, let us consider the permission Approval is an explicit mobile
member of role DIR, TELLER and FPS in the scheme. If Alice, with the activated adminis-
trative role BankSO, locally revokes Approval’s mobile membership from TELLER, the re-
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Senior Security Officer(SSO)







Figure 2.7: Administrative role assignment in the scheme
Admin.role Prereq.condition Role Range
NSSO DIR [M1, M1]
NSSO DIR [M2, M2]
NSSO DIR [M3, M3]
APSO M1 ^OP [QC, QC]
APSO M1 ^QC [OP, OP]
BankSO M1 ^TE ^AU [AC, AC]
BankSO M1 ^TE ^AC [AU, AU]
BankSO M1 ^AU ^AC [TE, TE]
ShopSO M1 ^SALER [AUDITOR, AUDITOR]
ShopSO M1 ^AUDITOR [SALER, SALER]
Table 2.10: Can-assignp-M of Figure 2.6
vocation is successful by the local revocation algorithmLocal-revokep-M(BankSO; TELL-
ER;Approval). Because
RoleRange=RoleRange(admin:role=BankSO(can-revokep-M ))=[Bank;M2),
RoleswithApproval=RoleName(PerName=Approval (ROLE-PERM )) =fDIR; TELLER;FPSg.
Therefore,
TELLER 2 RoleRange \RoleswithApproval = fTELLERg 6= ;
Approval continues to be an implicit mobile member of TELLER since FPS is junior
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Admin.role Prereq.Condition Role Range
NSSO FPS [FPS, DIR]
APSO AP [AP, M1]
BankSO Bank [Bank, M2]
ShopSO Shop [Shop, M3]
Table 2.11: Can-revokep-M
to TELLER and Approval is an explicit mobile member of FPS. It is necessary to note that
Alice should have enough power in the session to locally revoke Approval explicitly from
FPS, but she is not allowed to proceed because BankSO does not have the authority of local
revocation from FPS according to the can-revokep-M relation in Table 2.11. Therefore, if
Alice wants to revoke Approval’s explicit membership as well as implicit membership from
TELLER by local revocation, she needs to activate NSSO and locally revoke Approval from
TELLER and FPS.
If Alice, with the activated administrative role NSSO, globally revokesApproval’s mem-
bership from TELLER, then Approval is removed not only from explicit membership in
TELLER, but also from explicit (and implicit) membership in all roles junior to TELLER.
Actually, using the global revocation algorithmGlobal-revokep-M(NSSO, TELLER, Approval),
P=fApprovalg=P . We do not need Local-revokep-M(NSSO, TELLER, Approval) since
Approval 2 P . The junior set of role TELLER is fFPSg. Then the permissionApproval has
been removed from FPS as well as TELLER by running Local-revokep-M(NSSO, TELLER,
Approval) and Local-revokep-M(NSSO, FPS, Approval). However, Approval still has a
member of DIR since it is not a junior role to TELLER based on the role hierarchy of
Figure2.7.
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2.5 RELATED WORK AND COMPARISONS
Our work substantially differs from [88] in two aspects. First, the paper [88] only introduce
the definition of mobility of permission-role membership in permission-role assignment. By
contrast, we discuss various cases in detail and focus on possible problems with mobil-
ity of permission-role relationship. Second, the authors only described the management of
permission-role assignment with mobility in [88], but do not mention conflicts when assign-
ing permissions to roles. Therefore, there is no support to deal administrative roles with
regular roles in the proposal, especially mobile and immobile members. In this section, we
present a number of special authorization algorithms for access control, especially the lo-
cal and global revocation algorithms which have not been studied before. These algorithms
provide a rich variety of options that can handle the document of administrative roles with
permissions as mobile and immobile members. In our earlier work [103], we developed
authorization approaches for permission-role assignment. The work in this section is an
extension of that study. Actually, if all membership is restricted to being mobile, our algo-
rithms can imply the algorithms described in [103]. Moreover, compared with [103], mobile,
immobile memberships and prerequisite conditions are discussed in this paper.
2.6 SUMMARY
In this chapter, we provide new authorization allocation algorithms for RBAC along with
mobility that is based on relational algebra operations. The authorization granting algo-
rithm, local and global revocation algorithm defined in this section can automatically check
conflicts when granting more than one permission as mobile or immobile member to a role
in the system. We have also discussed how to use these algorithms for an electronic payment
scheme.
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CHAPTER 3
ABDM: AN EXTENDED FLEXIBLE
DELEGATION MODEL IN RBAC
In this chapter, we extend user to group and permission to ability. Based on this, we proposed
a flexible ability-based delegation model and developed delegation algorithms accordingly.
We analyze the delegating framework including delegating authorization and revocation with
constraints on an ability-based delegation. To our best knowledge, our introduced ability-
based delegation model has not been discussed before.
The information in this chapter is based on a published paper [59, 61].
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In role based access control systems, the delegation requirement arises when a user needs to
act on another user’s behalf to access resources. This might be only within a limited time,
for example, a vacation, sharing resources temporarily with others, and so on. Otherwise
users may perceive security as a hindrance and bypass it. With delegation, the delegated
user has the privileges to react to situations or access information without referring back
to the delegating user. The basic idea behind the delegation is that some active entity in a
system delegates authority to another active entity to carry out some functions on behalf of
the former. For example, when an agent is unable to perform a task due to sickness, s/he
may delegate the privileges to another agent so that the latter agent can use the privileges
to complete the task on time. It is through the delegation that the agent is able to function
effectively. Normally, a delegator in a delegation is an agent that delegates a certain task to
46
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another agent or a group of agents. The delegator has the permission to perform a certain
action and also the ability to further delegate this right. A delegatee is the one who has been
delegated to execute a delegated task. A number of models dealing with various aspects of
delegation have been published and been proven to be a flexible and useful access control
for information sharing on a distributed collaborative environment [87, 43, 91, 71, 44, 103].
Gasser and McDermott addressed user-to-machine delegation [43]. Stein explored delega-
tion and inheritance on the object-oriented environment [91]. Nagaratnam and Lea introduce
process-to-process delegation in the distributed object environment [71]. Sandhu et al. ad-
dressed delegation among the role administrators in the ARBAC97 model [87]. Goh and
Baldwin dealt with delegation as an attribute of roles [44]. Delegation is also applied in
decentralize trust management [16, 57]. Blaze et al. [16] identified the trust management
problem as a distinct and important component of security in network services and Li et
al. [57] made a logic-based knowledge representation for authorization with tractable trust-
management in large-scale, open, distributed systems. Delegation was used to address the
trust management problem including formulating security policies and security credentials,
determining whether particular sets of credentials satisfy the relevant policies, and defer-
ring trust to third parties. Zhang et al. [7, 8, 117] proposed a rule-based framework for
role-based delegation including RDM2000 model, which supports a user-user delegation
primarily based on roles. The PBDM [115] model supports both role and permission level
delegation. Wang et al. [100] proposed a role-based delegation model which support user-
group delegation. However, all of these do not support ability-based user-user delegation and
ability-based user-group delegation.
Actually, in many situations, a delegator wants to delegate a collection of permissions
(named an ability) to delegatees. There may be some problems arising in the previous del-
egation models. For example, the permission of opening a bank account is composed of
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many different individual permissions, such as, accessing identification, social secure his-
tory, credit limits and so on. When the delegator wants to delegate his ability (opening an
account) to others, it does not make sense to delegate only part of the permissions to dele-
gatees, since the entire set is needed to do the task properly. If the number is huge, it may
be difficult to complete the delegation with PBDM, since each time only one permission can
be assigned to a role in a permission-based delegation model. In this chapter, we propose a
new delegation model, named an ability-based delegation model, which can solve this prob-
lem easily. We focus exclusively on this ability-based delegation framework, which provides
great flexibility in authority management.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 3.2, we propose a developed
assignment framework which includes group-role assignment and ability-role assignment.
Our new introduced ability-based delegation model (ABDM) including delegation granting
and revocation models are given in Section 3.3. We compare our work with other works in
Section 3.4 and summary the chapter in Section 3.5.
3.2 ABILITY, GROUP AND AUTHORIZATION ASSIGNMENT
Role-based access control (RBAC) involves individual users being associated with roles as
well as roles being associated with permissions (each permission is a pair of objects and
operations). As such, a role is used to associated users and permissions. A user in this model
is a human being. A role is a job function or job title within the organization associated
with authority and responsibility. A permission is an approval of a particular operation to
ba performed on one or more objects. When we want to open a bank account, many differ-
ent individual permissions are involved. It does not make sense to assign only part of the
permissions to a role, since the entire set is needed to do the task properly. The idea is that
application developers package permissions into collections, named ability, which must be
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assigned together as a unit to a role. Once the notion of ability is introduced, by analogy
there should be a similar concept on the user side.
An ability is a collection of permissions that should be assigned as a single unit to a role.
We denote B as the set of abilities.
A group is a collection of users who can accept a role assignment at the same time. Such
a group can be viewed as a team. We denote G as the set of groups.
In comparison to the previous permission-role assignment, ability-role assignment is
more difficult to achieve. Since if there is a huge number of permissions involved in an
ability, we have to do an excessive number of jobs in order to finish the ability-role as-
signment, because each time we can assign just one permission to the role according to the
previous permission-role assignment. So it is desired to assign all of the permissions in the
ability to the role at once. The same situation happens when we want to define a group with
a large number of users for role assignment. Since the function of an ability (or a group) is to
collect permissions (or users) together so that administrators can treat them as a single unit,
assigning abilities to roles and groups to roles are therefore very much like permission-role
assignment and user-role assignment. In this way, the problems stated above can be resolved
easily.
A prerequisite condition is an expression using Boolean operators ‘^’ and ‘_’ on terms
of the form r and r where r is a role and ‘^’ means ‘and’, ‘_’ means ‘or’. A prerequisite
condition is evaluated for a user u by interpreting r to be true if (9r0  r); (u; r0) 2 UA and
r to be true if (9r0  r); (u; r0) =2 UA, where UA is a set of user-role assignments.
Note that the notion of a prerequisite condition is identical to that, expect the boolean
expression is now evaluated for membership and nonmembership of an ability (or a group)
in specified roles. For a given set of roles R, let CR denotes all prerequisite conditions that
can be formed using the roles in R. AR is the set of administrative roles. This leads to the
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following definitions.
Definition 3.1. Ability-role assignment and revocation are, respectively authorized by
can assigna  AR CR 2R
can revokea  AR 2R
The meaning of can assigna(x; y; Z) is that a member of the administrative role x can
assign an ability whose current membership satisfies the prerequisite condition y to regular
roles in range Z. The meaning of can revokea(x; Y ) is that a member of the administrative
role x can revoke membership of an ability from any regular role y 2 Y .
Definition 3.2. Group-role assignment and revocation are, respectively, authorized by
can assigng  AR CR 2R
can revokeg  AR 2R
The meaning of can assigng(x; y; Z) is that a member of the administrative role x can
assign a group whose current membership satisfies the prerequisite condition y to regular
roles in range Z. The meaning of can revokeg(x; Y ) is that a member of the administrative
role x can revoke membership of a group from any regular role y 2 Y . To identify a role
range within the role hierarchy, the following closed and open intervals are used.
[x; y] = fr 2 Rjx  r ^ r  yg (x; y] = fr 2 Rjx > r ^ r  yg
[x; y) = fr 2 Rjx  r ^ r > yg (x; y) = fr 2 Rjx > r ^ r > yg.
3.3 ABILITY-BASED DELEGATION MODEL (ABDM)
In this section we propose our flexible ability-based delegation model which supports role
hierarchy. An intuitive overview of this model is described first, and then a formal definition
will be presented.
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Figure 3.1: Example of ability delegation
3.3.1 ABILITY-BASED USER-USER DELEGATION
The central idea of this model is to create one or more delegation roles (DTR), and assign
abilities to them. In RBAC, permissions are associated with roles, and users are assigned to
appropriate roles thereby acquiring the roles’ permissions. For example, in Figure 3.1 John
who is in role PL acquires an ability b and a permission p. If John wants to delegate his
ability b to Jenny, he can delegate according to the following three phases.
1. John creates a temporary delegation role D1.
2. John assigns the ability b to D1 with ability-role assignment.
3. John assigns Jenny to D1 with user-role assignment.
Roles in DTR are distinct from regular roles (RR). DTR cannot be assigned to any
other roles, because it will generate invalid ability inheritance in the role hierarchy. There-
fore, roles in this model are partitioned into regular roles (RR) and delegation roles (DTR).
This partition induces a parallel partition of UA and BA which are user-role assignment
and ability-role assignment respectively. UA is separated into user-regular role assignment
(UAR) and user-delegation role assignment (UAD). BA is similarly separated into ability-
regular role assignment (BAR) and ability-delegation role assignment (BAD). Delegation
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role can be placed in the regular role hierarchy when the delegated ability includes all the
permissions of a delegating role, otherwise it is isolated from the hierarchy. Delegation
role cannot have any senior regular role if it is placed in the role hierarchy, since delegated
abilities cannot be inherited through role-role hierarchy.
We have the following components for ability-based delegation model:
Sets: U;B;R;RR;DTR are sets of users, abilities, roles, regular roles, and delegation
roles respectively.
R = RR [DTR
UAR  U RR is a user to a regular role assignment relation.
UAD  U DTR is a user to a delegation role assignment relation.
UA = UAR [ UAD
BAR  B RR is an ability to a regular role assignment relation.
BAD  B DTR is an ability to a delegation role assignment relation.
BA = BAR [BAD
Abilities: R! 2B is a function mapping a role to a set of abilities.
Abilities(r) = Abilities R(r) [ Abilities D(r)
where
Abilities R(r) = fbj9r0 < r; (b; r0) 2 BARg
Abilities D(r) = fbj9r0 < r; (b; r0) 2 BADg
senior(r) : P ! 2R, a function mapping a role to all its senior roles in role hierarchy.
8dtr 2 DTR; senior(dtr)\RR = ;: for each delegation role there is no senior regular
role.
own(u) : U ! 2DTR and @(u1; u2 2 U; dtr 2 DTR); (u1 6= u2) ^ (dtr 2 own(u1) ^
dtr 2 own(u2)), a function mapping a user to a set of delegation roles which he/she created.
ability d(r) : DTR! 2B, a function mapping a delegation role to a set of abilities.
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ability(u): a function mapping a user to a set of abilities with BAD.
ability(u) = fb 2 Bj9r 2 DTR; (u; r) 2 UAD ^ (b; r) 2 BADg
A delegation relation in ability-based user-user delegation model is a constraint on UAD
and BAD.
3.3.2 ABILITY-BASED USER-GROUP DELEGATION
Now we analyze group delegation. In some cases, we may need to define whether or not a
user can delegate an ability to a group and howmany times, or up to the maximum delegation
depth. We only analyze one-step group delegation in this paper which means the maximum
delegation path is 1. Figure 3.2 shows the role hierarchy structure of RBAC in an example of
a problem-oriented system POS which has two projects. In Figure 3.3 Tony who is in role
Co2 acquires all the permissions and abilities of role Co2. Now Tony wants to delegate one
of his abilities to Project 1, which means Tony wants to delegate the ability to all people
involved in Project 1. According to the ability-based user-user delegation, in the third step
we have to use user-role assignment. If the number of users in Project 1 is small, it may
be easy to finish, otherwise, it is hard to finish the work as each time just one user can be
assigned to the role. It will be time-consuming if based on user-user delegation. To solve
the problem, we propose an ability-based group delegation framework , in which Tony can
finish the delegation according to following steps:
1. Tony creates a temporary delegation role D1.
2. Tony assigns the ability b to D1 with ability-role assignment.
3. Tony assigns all user of Project 1 to D1 with group-role assignment.
In fact, ability-based group delegation is achieved by ability-role assignment and group-
role assignment. Previously, a delegation role cannot have any senior roles since delegated
abilities cannot be inherited. Roles in this model are partitioned into regular roles RR and
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Delegation Algorithm
Input: delegator u, ability b, delegatee.
Output: true if delegator u can delegate an ability b to delegatee;
false otherwise.
Step 1: /*Delegator creates a temporary delegation role D1 */
Suppose (u; r) 2 UA which means that delegator u is in role r,
Let Poolwithrole r = fpj(p; r) 2 PAg [ fbj(b; r) 2 BAg,
/*Poolwithrole r is the set of all permissions and abilities which
are related to role r*/
If fbg = Poolwithrole r /*role r only has an ability b*/
Delegator can let role r to be the temporary delegation role D1.
go to Step 3
If fbg  Poolwithrole r
/*role r not only has the ability b but also other permissions*/
Delegator creates a temporary delegation role D1.
go to Step 2
else
return false and stop.
Step 2: /*whether the delegator can assign the abilityb to
delegation role D1 or not*/
Let S = RoleRange(delegator(can assigna))
/*S is the role range where the ability b can be assigned to*/
If D1 2 S, /* the delegation role is in the role range*/
go to Step 3.
/* the ability b can be assigned to D1 by delegator*/
else
return false and stop.
Step 3: /*whether the delegator can assign the delegatee to
the delegation role D1*/
Suppose the delegatee is a user u0,
Let S = RoleRange(delegator(can assign)),
/* S is the role range where the user can be assigned to*/
If D1 2 S, /* the delegation role is in the role range*/
the user u0 can be assigned to the delegation role D1.
Suppose the delegatee is a group g,
Let S = RoleRange(delegator(can assigng)),
/* S is the role range where the group can be assigned to*/
If D1 2 S, /* the delegation role is in the role range*/




CHAPTER 3. ABDM: AN EXTENDED FLEXIBLE DELEGATION MODEL IN RBAC
Min Li Ph.D Dissertation - 55 of 167
RoleName Prereq.Condition M
HO2 [AP, Ho1] 1
Co1 CS 2




Table 3.2: Example of del revokea
delegation roles (DTR). This partition induces a parallel partition of GA and BA which
are group-role assignment and ability-role assignment respectively. GA is separated into
group-regular role assignment (GAR) and group-delegation role assignment (GAD). BA
is similarly separated into ability-regular role assignment (BAR) and ability-delegation role
assignment (BAD). Hence we have the following elements and functions in group delega-
tion:
Sets: U;G;B;R;RR;DTR are sets of users, groups, abilities, roles, regular roles, and
delegation roles respectively.
R = RR [DTR
GAR  GRR is a group to a regular role assignment relation.
GAD  GDTR is a group to a delegation role assignment relation.
GA = GAR [GAD.
BAR  B RR is an ability to a regular role assignment relation.
BAD  B DTR is an ability to a delegation role assignment relation.
BA = BAR [BAD
Abilities: R! 2B is a function mapping a role to a set of abilities.
Abilities(r) = Abilities R(r) [ Abilities D(r)
where
Abilities R(r) = fbj9r0 < r; (b; r0) 2 BARg
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Abilities D(r) = fbj9r0 < r; (b; r0) 2 BADg
senior(r) : P ! 2R, a function mapping a role to all its senior roles in role hierarchy.
8dtr 2 DTR; senior(dtr)\RR = ;: for each delegation role there is no senior regular
role.
own(u) : U ! 2DTR and @(u1; u2 2 U; dtr 2 DTR); (u1 6= u2) ^ (dtr 2 own(u1) ^
dtr 2 own(u2)), a function mapping a user to a set of delegation roles which he/she created.
ability d(r) : DTR! 2B, a function mapping a delegation role to a set of abilities.
ability(g): a function mapping a group to a set of abilities with BAD.
ability(g) = fb 2 Bj9r 2 DTR; (g; r) 2 GAD ^ (b; r) 2 BADg
A delegation relation in an ability-based user-group delegation model is a constraint on
GAD and BAD.
The delegation algorithm described above provides a way for the delegator to delegate
an ability to the desired delegatee.
3.3.3 ABILITY-BASED DELEGATION AUTHORIZATION
In this section, we develop the delegating and revocation models. The goal of the delega-
tion authorization is to impose restrictions on which role can be delegated to whom. Here,
we partially adopt the notation of prerequisite condition from [103] to introduce delegation
authorization in the delegation framework.
Definition 3.3. can delegatea is a relation of RR  CR M where RR;CR;M are sets
of regular roles, prerequisite conditions, and maximum delegation depth, respectively.
The meaning of can delegatea(r; cr;m) means a delegator having regular role r who
can delegate an ability to any user or group whose current entitlements in role satisfy the
prerequisite condition cr without exceeding the maximum delegation depth m. Table 3.1
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Figure 3.3: Example of Group Delegation
shows the can delegatea relations with the prerequisite conditions in the POS example.
The meaning of can delegatea(Ho2; [AP;Ho1]; 1) is that a user of role Ho2 can delegate
his/her ability to a group in which users are members of either role AP , or Co1, or Re1,
or Ho1. In addition, the delegated ability cannot be re-delegated to other users or groups
where the maximum depth of delegation is 1. The second tuple authorizes that a user of role
Co1 can assign an ability to another user who has CS role and the delegated ability can be
re-delegated to other users or groups with the maximum depth of delegation of 2.
Definition 3.4. An ability-based delegation revocation is a relation del revokea  RR 
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2R, where RR is the set of regular roles.
The meaning of (x; Y )  del revokea is that a delegator who has regular role x can
revoke the relationship of a user or group from any role y 2 Y , where Y defines the range
of revocation. Table 3.2 gives the del revokea relation in Figure 3.2. The first tuple shows
that the delegator who has the roleHo1 can revoke a delegation relationship of a group from
any role in [Co1; CS]. The second tuple shows that the delegator who has the role Re1 can
revoke a delegation relationship of a user from role in AP .
Actually, the revocation process can be finished through any of the following cases:
1. Revoke the user-delegation role assignment or group-delegation role assignment.
2. Revoke the ability-delegation role assignment.
3. Revoke the delegation role.
3.4 RELATED WORK AND COMPARISONS
The close work to this paper is role-based delegation [8], role-based group delegation [100]
and permission-based delegation [115].
Barka and Sandhu [8] proposed a simple model for role-based delegation called RBDM0.
They developed a framework for identifying interesting cases that can be used for building
role-based delegation models. This is accomplished by identifying the characteristics related
to delegation, using these characteristics to generate possible delegation cases. Their work
is different from ours in three aspects. First, the unit of delegation in RBDM0 is ‘role’,
which means the delegator can just delegate roles to delegatee. Whereas, our work supports
a piece of role delegation not only of some permissions but also a unit of permissions, called
ability. Second, [8] focuses on a simple user-user delegation model supporting only flat roles
and single step delegation. By contrast, our work develops users to groups and proposes
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a user-group delegation model based on ability. Third, some important features such as
role hierarchies, constraints and revocations are not supported. But, our work has analyzed
delegation authorization and revocation models with constraints involving role hierarchies.
In [100], the authors proposed a role-based group delegation model in which a delegating
user can delegate a role to a group at one time. Our work totally differs from that. The authors
in [100] did not discuss partial role delegation. In some situations, a delegator may want to
delegate permissions rather than roles to a delegatee. Moreover, our model not only supports
permission-based delegation but also extends it to ability-based delegation.
Permission-based delegation model(PBDM) is first proposed in [115]. PBDM supports
user-user delegation based on permissions and roles. In our work, we extend their work and
propose ability-based delegation. If we restrict an ability to a permission, our model will
reduce to PBDM. Moreover, [115] does not mention one-to-many delegation, whereas, we
discuss the user-group delegation specifically. Finally, some important features such as au-
thorization, constraints and revocations are discussed shortly in PBDM, whereas we analyze
delegating framework including delegation authorization and revocation with constraints.
3.5 SUMMARY
The main contribution of this chapter is to introduce a new and flexible ability-based delega-
tion framework within RBAC. Moreover, we extend the framework to include both delega-
tion granting and revocation. The work presented in this chapter has significantly extended
previous work, which provides a flexible and useful management of delegation authority in
a role-based access control environment.




In this chapter, we decompose delegation tasks into three different levels according to the
sensitivity of each delegation task. Each level has different requirement of reliability of
cooperation partners. We also propose a new effective trust evaluation technique which
considers both trust values and trust trend. The trust value provides an indication for the
final trust level while, the trust trend value is used to predict the future trend of trust. We
build a projection between the reliability of the delegatee and the sensitivity of delegated
tasks, which leads to a secure multi-level delegation model.
The information in this chapter is based on a published paper [66].
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Role-based delegation based on role-based access control (RBAC) has been proven to be a
flexible and useful access control for information sharing in distributed collaborative envi-
ronments [8, 115, 70]. In contrast to normal access right administration operations which
are performed centrally, delegation operations are usually performed in a distributed man-
ner. Security of delegation becomes one big issue that has received attention during the past
few years in distributed systems. In this section, we are interested in the delegation of tasks
(task-delegation) as compared with the delegation of rights only (right-delegation) described
in [1]. Both task-delegation and rights-delegation involve the release of rights from one
principal to another. However, in the case of task-delegation, we consider the situation in
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which an entity issues an imperative command to another entity to perform the delegated
task within the broad area of security.
Our line of reasoning is motivated by the real-world situations in which one entity del-
egates some rights to a second entity with the explicit command to complete a given task
validly and securely. Loosely defined, a task consists of a number of computational oper-
ations to be performed based on some data which may be sensitive, and if insecure may
be misused or disclosed to public. Here, we organize delegated tasks into three different
levels according to their sensitivity as shown in Table 4.1. For simplicity of discussion, in
this paper we consider three-level partitions of delegated tasks, which are Low, Medium,
and High. The classification standard is flexible, which can be determined by a delegator
with his or her subjective preference. A Low task level indicates the delegation task does
not include sensitive information or resources that can cause a breach. The information in
a Low level of the delegation task is public information that can be delegated to anyone for
information sharing. The tasks in the Medium level contain information that is partially
public and partially sensitive. When referring to the delegation, there should be a higher
requirement on the reliability of the delegatee, since the more reliable the delegatee is, the
less chance the sensitive information would be misused, and the more likely the delegation
task could be accomplished successfully. The High task level indicates the delegation task
is very important and contains highly sensitive information and requires that the delegatee
should be totally trustworthy.
Essentially, a delegation operation could temporarily change the access control state so
as to allow an agent to use another agent’s access privileges. Due to its effect on the access
control state, delegation may lead to violation of security policies. More precisely, informa-
tion breaching may happen even during the delegation phase. This refers to any information,
the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or modification of which could adversely affect
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the privacy to which individuals are entitled. Thus, risk during the delegation must not be
overlooked, and more sophisticated methods are needed to create a secure delegation sys-
tem. More specifically, delegation policies may depend on private aspects concerning both
the delegatee’s reliability and the sensitivity of the delegated tasks.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, we describe the
motivation of this paper. In Section 4.3, the new trust evaluation approach is proposed by
combining trust values and trust trend together to predict a delegatee’s trustworthiness. In
Section 4.4, we propose a multi-level delegation model with trust management and discuss
several different delegation types. We show our experimental results in Section 4.5 and
provide a brief survey of related work in Section 4.6. Finally, we summary this chapter in
Section 4.7.
Task level Information Properties
The information is not sensitive and canLow Public
be delegated to anyone.
Not public The information is partially sensitive and shouldMedium
partially sensitive be delegated to reliable delegatees.
Not public The information is totally sensitive and shouldHigh
totally sensitive be delegated to someone with higher reliability.
Table 4.1: The classification of delegation tasks
4.2 MOTIVATION
In an open environment, the entities are customarily alien to each other. When entering into
a delegation, the delegator is entering into an uncertain interaction in which there is a risk of
failure due to the delegation decisions. In other words, a given delegatee may not be reliable
for the delegated task, especially, when sensitive information is included in the delegation
tasks, the delegator’s privacy may be breached because of the unreliability of the delegatee.
For example, if the task being delegated is a goal comprising of multiple tasks and requir-
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ing access to multiple resources and sensitive information, the delegation in this case should
be very cautious, since the failure of the delegation has considerable influence on privacy
disclosure. Therefore, when delegating a task, the choice of the cooperative partner plays
an important role in determining whether the task would be fulfilled successfully or not. In
order to operate effectively, delegators need some mechanisms for finding reliable partners,
and this requirement could be satisfied with the help of trust. Trust is well recognized as a
means of assessing the risk of cooperating with others [31, 55, 68, 111]. There are two main
categories of trust: experience-based and recommendation-based [81, 113]. In the former
category, agents assess the trust solely based on their own experience; in the latter, trust is
evaluated based on information provided by others (typically in addition to individual ex-
perience). Within this trust evaluation mechanism, a final trust value is computed to reflect
the general trust status of every service provider. However, such a single trust value can-
not reflect the real trust status very well. For example, assume the trust values are in the
range of [0,1]. A person with a higher trust value 0.9 may behave worse in future than the
one with the trust value 0.6. This simple example demonstrates that the single-value trust
evaluation approach can not reflect future changes in trust. Trust trend evaluation becomes
important in order to indicate whether the trust will become better or worse in the forthcom-
ing cooperation. Therefore, new effective trust evaluation approaches are required to provide
more precise trust information that could indicate to what extent and during which period a
delegatee is reliable and trustworthy.
Even though delegation is well recognized as a very useful component of access control
systems [8, 30, 115], to our best knowledge, no current work has performed an in-depth study
on how to manage a delegation in a secure manner. Typically, we are facing the following
challenges in developing a secure multi-level delegation model by taking trust into account:
Challenge One: Since the sharing of sensitive information must be restricted to trust-
CHAPTER 4. MULTI-LEVEL DELEGATIONS WITH TRUST MANAGEMENT
Min Li Ph.D Dissertation - 64 of 167
worthy parties, how to develop effective trust evaluation approaches to provide more precise
trust information? The developed method should not only predict the trust value but also
capture its future trend.
Challenge Two: Faced with the fact that delegation tasks in different levels require dif-
ferent reliability of delegatees, how to build the projection between the reliability of the del-
egatees and the sensitivity of the delegated tasks, and further construct a secure multi-level
delegation model?
4.3 TRUST EVALUATION
The notion of trust is well recognized as a means of assessing the risk of cooperating with
others [31, 111, 105]. In a delegation, it is important to tell delegators to what extent a dele-
gatee is trustworthy for the delegated task. Corresponding to the different levels of delegated
tasks, in this section we organize the trust into three trust levels, in which delegators could
evaluate the trustworthiness of delegatees.
Trust represents an agent’s estimate of how likely another is to fulfil its commitments.
Trust influences the delegators attitudes and actions, but can also have effects on the del-
egatee and other elements in the environment. As discussed before, a trust value can be
calculated to provide more precise indication of the trust history to a delegator. However, it
is not enough to indicate the real trust status of a delegatee very well, i.e., the single-value
approach cannot reflect changes of the trust trend. In this paper, we adopt two interpretations
of trust. One is to view trust as the perceived reliability history of somebody, called “reli-
ability trust”, while the other is to view trust as a trend of trust changes in a given period,
called “future trust”.
Definition 4.1 (Reliability trust). Reliability trust is the trust status of individuals depen-
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Figure 4.1: Weighted least-squares exponential regression
dent on his/her history behavior.
As the name suggests, reliability trust can be interpreted as the subjective probability of
someone performing a given action on which its success lies. In our previous work [60], we
evaluated reliability trust in three steps: (1) Calculate the trust value based on histories; (2)
Calculate the trust value from recommendations; (3) Combine the observed trust values from
histories and recommendations. With this approach, we can obtain a delegatee’s reliability
trust value. However, trust can be more complex. Future trust aims to capture the changes of
trust trend in the forthcoming future. Namely, given a set of delegatees with the same trust
value, the one which is becoming better is more desirable to delegators and more reliable to
fulfill the delegated work well.
Definition 4.2 (Future trust). Future trust is a general trend of changes which could be
useful to predict the future trust level of service quality.
In order to evaluate future trust, we refer to the idea of exponential regression [99]. In this
section, we introduce a weighted exponential regression method to evaluate the trust trend
(shown as Figure 4.1). This method is used to obtain the best exponential fit from a set of
given data points. This best exponential fit is characterized by the sum of weighted squared
residuals with its least value, where a residual is the difference between a data point and the
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regression curve. Once obtaining the exponential regression, the gradient at each data point
can be taken as our future trust value. Now we introduce the trust trend evaluation method.
Let (t1; q1); (t2; q2); : : : ; (tn; qn) denote the given data points in a certain period, where
qi(qi 2 [0; 1]) is the service quality value at time ti(ti < ti+1; 1  i  n). Then the
exponential regression can be represented as
q = a0e
a1t + a2 (4.1)
where a0, a1 and a2 are constants to be determined, specially, the product of a0 and a1
indicates the trust trend value. As the distance from point (ti; qi) to the regression curve is
di = jqi   (a0ea1ti + a2)j (4.2)
Based on the method of weighted least squares, we let w(i) be the weight function for the
service quality qi at the ith service (i = 1   n). The choice of w(i) could be flexible. Any
monotonic increasing function could be a candidate of w(i). For simplicity, in this paper, we
adopt w(i) = i , (1  i  n;   1) as our weight function. Thus, the sum of squares of the







w(i)2(qi   (a0ea1ti + a2))2 (4.3)
Now our task is to minimize the sum of the distance S with respect to the parameters a0,
a1 and a2, with the method of undetermined coefficients.
Since function S is continuous and differentiable, based on the Lagrange Multiplier
method [97], the minimization point of S makes the first derivative of function S be zero.
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w(i)2(qi   (a0ea1ti + a2))ea1ti = 0 (4.6)
Equations (4.4), (4.5) and (4.6) can be solved for the unknown a0, a1 and a2. Thus, based
on the method of weighted least squares exponential regression, we can obtain the trust trend
value a0a1(a0; a1 2 R). The trust trend value shows a general trend of changes of trust in
the near future, which is important when we choose a delegatee with serious caution. If
a0a1 > 0, it indicates that the future trust is up-going, whereas, a0a1 < 0 indicates that the
future trust is dropping; and a0a1 = 0 indicates the future trust remains unchanged.
Both reliability trust and future trust reflect different trust status about the individuals
on whom the delegator depends for the delegation task. Reliability trust is most naturally
measured as a degree of reliability, which is expressed as a continuous function mapped into
[0,1], whereas future trust indicates the trend of trust changes, which ranges from  1 to
+1. To work efficiently, we combine reliability trust and future trust into different trust
levels to illustrate the trustworthiness of a delegatee. To be consistent with delegated task
levels, three trust levels are organized through the following projection:
Definition 4.3 (Trust level). Let T be the set of reliability trust values and TT be the set
of future trust values. The F function projects reliability trust and future trust into three
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different trust levels.
F : T  TT ! fL;M;Hg
where L;M;H refers to Low,Medium and High trust levels.
High trust level denotes the person at this level is highly trusted, which means not only
his final trust value is high but also the trust trend is up-going. Low level denotes the person
is less trusted, where his final trust value is low, also the trust trend is dropping. Medium
level is the intermediate state. So the trust level assignments can be further explained as
follows:
8t 2 T; a0a1 2 TT
 F (t; a0a1) = L, if t 2 (0; 0:5) and a0a1 2 ( 1; 0)
 F (t; a0a1) = M , if t 2 [0:5; 1) and a0a1 2 ( 1; 0]; or t 2 (0; 0:5] and a0a1 2 [0;+1)
 F (t; a0a1) = H , if t 2 (0:5; 1) and a0a1 2 (0;+1)
Until now, each delegatee is companied with a trust level, which could indicate to what
extent the delegatee is reliable. So far, the problem left is to build the delegation model based
on the evaluation of trust. Our idea is that the delegatee who is trusted to a greater degree
would have a higher probability of completing the delegated task than a delegatee with a
lower trust level. The formalized delegation model is described in the next section.
4.4 THE MULTI-LEVEL DELEGATION MODEL
Delegation has received significant attention from the research community in recent years. A
number of delegation models have been proposed [30, 53, 98, 59] and most of them are for
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). A few research works related to introducing subjective
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trust into a delegation model have been reported [46, 110]. In this section, we build a multi-
level delegation model with trust management.
4.4.1 THE DELEGATION MODEL
In a multi-agent system, delegation is the primary mechanism of inter-agent collaboration
and cooperation [47, 53, 59, 77]. Delegation is a mechanism that allows an agent A to act
on another agent B’s behalf by making B’s access rights available to A. Suppose a task is
delegated from one to another, the latter actually gets the access right to work on this task.


















Figure 4.2: Distribution of delegations based on trust levels
Since delegation tasks are divided into three different levels, it is important to address
how to distribute these tasks to delegatees based on their trust levels. The idea is that a
delegatee in the high trust level can be assigned with the delegation task of all levels, which
are Low,Medium, andHigh. The delegatee in the medium trust level can be assigned with
Low andMedium level tasks, while the delegatee in the low trust level can only be assigned
with Low level tasks. In this case, all delegated tasks are assigned in a hierarchal style, since
the delegatee in a higher trust level is more trustworthy and is more likely to finish a higher
level delegation task than the one in a lower trust level. The distribution of delegation is
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shown in Figure 4.2. In order to describe the delegation in a precise manner, we focus on a
specific model about how delegatees gain access rights.
Definition 4.4. Let Dr; De; Dt be the set of delegators, delegatees, and delegated tasks re-
spectively. Level = fL;M;Hg is the set of trust levels (or delegated task levels). A delega-
tion relationship is defined asDR  DrDeLDtLfg; tg, whereDeL  DeLevel is
the membership between delegatees and trust levels, DtL  Dt  Level is the membership
between delegated tasks and task levels, and g; t refers to a grant or transfer operation.
The delegatee-trust level membership DeL denotes that each delegatee is assigned with
different trust levels andDtL denotes that each delegated task is assigned with different task
levels. For example, the delegation relationship (dr; (de; L); (dt;M); g) 2 DR indicates that
delegator dr has delegated the L level task dt to delegatee de in theM trust level via a grant
operation, while (dr; (de; L); (dt;M); t) indicates that delegator dr has delegated L level task
dt to delegatee de inM trust level via a transfer operation. The difference between grant
and transfer is shown as follows. A delegation operation is essentially an access control
state transition operation, which takes one of the following three forms:
 grant(dr; (de; l); (dt; l)): delegator dr grants the access of l level delegation task to dele-
gatee de who is in l trust level. After the delegation operation, de gains the access right to
dt and dr still keeps dt, where l 2 fL;M;Hg.
 trans(dr; (de; l); (dt; l)): delegator dr transfers the access of l level delegation task to
delegatee de who is in l trust level. After the delegation operation, de gains the access right
to dt and dr temporarily loses dt, where l 2 fL;M;Hg.
 revoke(dr; (de; l); (dt; l)): delegator dr revokes the delegated task dt from delegatee de.
Note that a delegator can grant or transfer different level tasks to delegatees, and only
the corresponding delegator can revoke the delegated task from the delegatee. For example,
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grant(Alice; (Bob;H), (read all emails, M); g) means Alice delegated the Medium level
task “read all emails” to Bob with High trust level via a grant operation, while after the
delegation Bob gains the access right to all emails and Alice still keeps the access right on
all emails. However, transfer(Alice; (Bob;H), (read all emails,M); t) means Alice dele-
gated theMedium level task “read all emails” to Bob with High trust level via a transfer
operation, and after the delegation Alice temporarily loses the access right to all emails.
Definitely, only Alice could revoke the delegated task “read all emails” from Bob.
Since delegation is performed in a distributed manner, in the sense that everyone may
perform delegation operations, it is undesirable to allow a delegator to delegate the tasks
in a completely unrestricted way. Delegation operations are thus subject to the control of
authorization rules, which takes one of the following three forms:
 can grant(cond; (dt; l)): a delegator who satisfies condition cond can grant the l level
task dt to other delegatees, where l 2 fL;M;Hg, cond is an expression formed through
using the binary operators _ and ^, the unary operator :, and parentheses.
 ca transfer(cond; (dt; l)): a delegator who satisfies condition cond can transfer the l
level task dt to other delegatees, where l 2 fL;M;Hg.
 can receive(cond; (dt; l)): a delegatee who satisfies condition cond can receive the l level
task dt from other delegators, where l 2 fL;M;Hg.
For example, the rule can receive(Clerk ^ M, (“read the documents”, M)) states that
anyone who is at the Medium trust level and a member of Clerk can receive the Medium
level task “read the document”.
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4.4.2 TYPES OF DELEGATIONS
Delegation models can be complicated. To create a delegation model, one needs to decide
on a number of features, such as whether the delegation is dated and valid only for a certain
period of time, whether delegatees can further delegate the tasks to others and so on. Re-
tention period refers to the time during which the delegation is valid. We denote TI as the
set of time intervals. Different types of delegations contained in our delegation model are
discussed as follows.
 Time Bound Delegation TBD  TI Dr DeLDtL: It is a delegation that is valid
only for a certain time period, where T is the set of time intervals.
For example, delegation ([12/06/2008, 10/08/2008], Alice, (Bob, H), (read all emails, M))
denotes that this delegation is only valid between 12/06/2008 and 10/08/2008 and only
during this period, Bob has the access right to all emails.
 Group Delegation GD  Dr DeLDtL: It can be used to delegate access rights to a
group of delegatees who satisfy certain conditions.
For example, delegation(Alice, (Employee, M), (read all emails, M))denotes that Alice
delegates the Medium level task “read all emails” to a group of employees who are in
Medium trust level.
 Action Restricted Delegation ARD  DrDeLDtLCD: This forces the delegatee
to satisfy certain conditions before the delegated task can be carried out, where CD is the
set of conditions.
For example, delegation(Alice, (Employee, M), (read all emails, M), (age(24), name(Bob)))
states that only employees who are in Medium trust level, aged 24 and named Bob can
gain the access right to “read all emails”.
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 Re-delegable Delegation RD  Dr DeLDtL fTrue; Falseg: In this delegation,
True means the delegated task could be re-delegated to others, while False means not.
For example, delegation(Alice, (Employee, M), (read all emails, M), true) denotes that the
delegatee is allowed to further delegate the task.
Delegation policy: Delegation policies describe rules for the delegation of rights. A rule for
delegation would be checking that an agent has the ability to delegate before allowing the
delegation to be approved. A policy can be viewed as a set of rules for a particular domain
that defines what permissions a user has and what permissions she/he can obtain. A policy
also contains basic or axiomatic rights that all individuals possess.
4.5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATIONS
The main goals of the experiments are two-fold. First, we study the precision of our trust
model in predicting the trend of the trust. Second, we investigate the effectiveness of our
proposed multi-level trust-based delegation model in terms of disclosure rate.
No. of data set Probability distribution function
1 exponential distribution (Exprnd)
2 geometric distribution (Geornd)
3 Poisson distribution (Poissrnd)
4 Uniform distribution (Unifrnd)
5 Normal distribution (Normrnd)
Table 4.2: Distributions of the data sets
Trust value and its trend evaluation: In this set of experiments, we compared the precision
of both the trust value and trust trend prediction with the existing method proposed in [58].
We denote E-regression as the exponential regression model proposed in this paper and L-
regression as the regression model of [58]. In order to evaluate the precision of the two
approaches, we generate five data sets with five different probability distribution functions
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as our test data, and each data set contains 5000 records, and each record is in the form of
(x; y), where 1  x  5000 and 0  y  1. Table 4.2 shows the probability distributions
of each data set. Different metrics are adopted in evaluating the precision of the trust value
and trust trend. For evaluating the precision of trust value, each data set is first divided into
training and testing sets, and both regression models are trained by the training sets and tested
by testing sets. If the predicted trust value is tpre and the actual trust value is tact, then the
precision is calculated as 1  jtpre tactj
tact
. The higher the value, the more precise the predicted
trust value. To evaluate the precision of the trust trend, we use the metric named vector
angle, which computes the angle between two vectors(trends). The vector angle is defined
to be the angle  between 0 and 180 degrees that satisfies the relationship: cos = t1t2jt1jjt2j ,
where jj refers to the vector length and the numerator denotes the inner product of the trends
t1 and t2. The closer the cosine value is to 1, the more similar two trends are. To reduce the
randomness, we run the evaluation for 1000 times for each data set to obtain the average.
The evaluation results are shown in Figure 4.3. Figure 4.3(a) displays the precision of
the trust value of both regression models under five different distributed data sets. We can
easily see that the average precision of our proposed exponential regression model is around
70%, which is superior to the linear regression model over all five different distributed data
sets. Figure 4.3(b) reports the precision of the trust trend for both regression models. From
the graph, the exponential regression model results in a more accurate trust trend compared
with the linear regression model over all the five different distributed data sets. The precision
of the trust trend for the linear regression model sometimes is quite low, for example, only
40% for the exponential distributed data set. This is because sometimes the linear regression
model predicts the opposite trust trend, which makes the cosine value negative and hence
drags down the average precision. Overall, the exponential regress model proposed in this
paper has more accurate precision in predicting both the trust value and trust trend than the
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Figure 4.3: (a) The precision of the trust value; (b) The precision of the trust trend.
linear regression model.
Effectiveness: Having verified the precision of our technique, we proceed to test its effec-
tiveness. In this set of experiments, we use the disclosure rate to measure the effectiveness
of our proposed multi-level delegation model. We are going to use H , M and L to denote
the High, Medium and Low level in the classification of delegation tasks or the trust level of
the delegatees, separately. Recall our trust-based delegation model, if a data requester is in
High trust level, then s/he can be assigned with H , M or L level tasks; if the data requester
is in Medium trust level, then s/he can be assigned with M or L level tasks; Otherwise, the
data requester can only be assigned with L level tasks. Suppose there are n data requesters,
among which there are nH data requesters with High level trust, nM requesters with Medium
level of trust, and nL with Low level of trust, where nH + nM + nL = n. In this case, the
requesters could totally access 3nH+2nM+nL delegation tasks, which indicates the number
of secure delegations. Consider the situation where there is no specification of trust levels,
the data requester, whatever the trust value and trend s/he holds, could receive three possible
task assignments. Then it would be 3(nH + nM + nL) delegations, and among those, there
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Figure 4.4: Disclosure rate comparison when varying (a) the number of H levels; (b) the
number ofM levels; (c) the number of L levels.
will be 3(nH + nM + nL)   (3nH + 2nM + nL) insecure delegations. Thus, we define the
disclosure rate as 1  3nH+2nM+nL
3(nH+nM+nL)
. The lower the rate is, the more secure the delegation is.
We randomly generate n data requesters, and evaluate how the number of data requesters in
H , M or L levels affect the disclosure rate. In order to reduce the randomness, we run the
test for 500 times for each data and use the average to mark the graph.
The results are shown in Figure 4.4. Figure 4.4(a) displays the disclosure rate by varying
the portion of H from 10% to 90%. From the graph, we can see that the disclosure rate is
decreasing as the amount of H increases. This is expected, since the more the H level re-
questers, the less insecure delegations there are, and the lower the disclosure rate is. Figure
4.4(b) describes the disclosure rate by varying M from 10% to 90%. The graph shows that
the disclosure rate almost remains unchanged with the increased portion ofM . Figure 4.4(c)
reports the effect of L on the disclosure rate. When varying the portion of L from 10% to
90%, the disclosure rate is ascending. It indicates that the more L level requesters are as-
signed to delegation tasks, the higher the chances for sensitive information to be disclosed.
However, our proposed delegation model could better avoid sensitive information disclo-
sure by specifying requesters’ trust levels. Therefore, in this case, our proposed multi-level
delegation model is superior to the traditional delegation model.
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4.6 RELATED WORK
Delegation has received considerable attention from the research community. In [8], Barka
and Sandhu proposed a framework for role-based delegation models (RBDM), which iden-
tifies a number of characteristics related to delegation. Example characteristics are mono-
tonicity, totality, and levels of delegation.
There exists a wealth of delegation models in literature [114, 115, 30]. Zhang et al. [114]
presented a role-based delegation model called RDM2000. Their model supports the speci-
fication of delegation authorization rules to impose restrictions on which roles can be dele-
gated to whom. Zhang et al. [115] proposed a role-based delegation model called PBDM,
which supports both role and permission level delegation. Their model controls delegation
operations through the notion of delegatable roles such that only permissions assigned to
these roles can be delegated to others. In [30], Crampton and Khambhammettu proposed a
delegation model that supports both grant and transfer. Atluri and Warner [6] studied how
to support delegation in workflow systems. They extended the notion of delegation to allow
conditional delegation, where conditions can be determined on time, workload and task at-
tributes. One may specify rules to determine under what condition a delegation operation
should be performed.
All of the above work focuses on the modeling and management of delegation, while
our paper focuses on developing a secure delegation model in access control systems. More
importantly, none of the above work discusses the trust relationship between delegators and
delegatees, but our delegation model is founded on trust. We also investigate the effective-
ness of our proposed multi-level delegation model and the experimental results confirm the
advantages of our model in privacy protection.
Trust evaluation is a recent approach for access control systems that enables resource re-
questers and providers in open systems to establish trust. Bonatti and Samarati [21] proposed
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a framework based on a policy language and an interaction model for regulating access to
network services. Their trust establishment framework uses logical rules for accessing ser-
vices and avoiding the unnecessary disclosure of sensitive information. Winsborough and Li
[109] introduced the Trust Target Graph (TTG) protocol for conducting trust negotiation. A
particular emphasis of their work was protection against leaking sensitive information dur-
ing a trust negotiation. PeerTrust [78] is a trust management system that uses a simple and
expressive policy language based on distributed logic programs. PeerTrust agents perform
automated trust negotiation to obtain access to sensitive resources. However, these studies
focus more on trust negotiation policies rather than building trust evaluation approaches. In
this work, we organize trust into different trust levels based on trust values and trust trend.
The trust value depicts the trust history, while trust trend depicts the future change of trust.
Moreover, we apply trust levels to delegation and develop a multi-level delegation model.
4.7 SUMMARY
In this chapter, we propose a multi-level delegation model with trust management, where
both delegation tasks and trust are organized into three levels. The delegation task levels are
classified according to information sensitivity, while, the trust levels combine trust values
and trust trend together to indicate to what extent a delegatee is reliable or trustworthy. Our
multi-level delegation model allows that a delegatee in a higher trust level can be assigned
with a higher level of task. In the experimental evaluations, we study the precision of our trust
model in predicting the trend of the trust and investigate the effectiveness of our proposed
multi-level delegation model in terms of information disclosures.
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CHAPTER 5
SPECIFYING USAGE CONTROL MODEL
WITH OBJECT CONSTRAINT LANGUAGE
This chapter focuses on constraints specification, that is how constraints can be represented.
The main contribution of this chapter is to specify constraints of the UCON model with
object constraints language (OCL). With OCL, we provide a tool to precisely describe con-
straints for system designers and administrators. The specification also provides the precise
meaning of the new features of UCON, such as the mutability of attributes and the continuity
of usage control decisions.
The information in this chapter is based on a published paper [65].
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Developments in information technology, especially in electronic commerce applications,
require additional features for access control. The recently proposed usage control (UCON)
model is a new access control model that extends traditional access control models in mul-
tiple aspects [107] and is considered as the next generation access control model [83]. The
usage control (UCON) model was introduced as a unified approach to capture a number of
extensions to traditional access control models. In the UCONmodel, the authorization-based
decision process utilizes subject attributes and object attributes. Attributes can be identities,
security labels, properties, capabilities, and so on. The UCONmodel includes obligation and
conditions as well as authorizations as part of the usage decision process to provide a richer
and finer decision capability. Obligations are requirements that have to be fulfilled for usage
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allowance. Conditions are subject and object-independent environmental requirements that
have to be satisfied for access. These decision predicates can be evaluated before or dur-
ing the exercise of a request. In addition, the usage of the target object may require certain
updates on subject or object attributes before, during or after a usage exercise.
Park and Sandhu [107, 83] presented the conceptual model of UCON, which consists
of several constraints. For example, people may have to click the ‘accept’ button for license
agreement or have to fill out a certain form to download a company’s whitepaper. In addition,
there are environmental requirements, such as, only IEEE member can access full papers in
the IEEE digital library. Constraints can be described in natural languages, such as English,
or in more formal languages. Natural language specification has the advantage of ease of
comprehension by human beings, but may be prone to ambiguities [108]. Constraints in
formal language are suitable for persons with a strong mathematical background, but difficult
for average business or system developers to use. For instance, Zhang et al. [116] proposed
a formalized specification of the principles of UCON with a temporal logic. The authors
in [116] are security experts and system developers who have to understand organizational
objectives and articulate major policy decisions.
Although constraints are one of the important components of the UCON model, there is
less study in previous works stressing this. This chapter aims to provide a tool to precisely
describe constraints for system designers and administrators and specify constraints of the
UCON model with object constraints language (OCL). The specification also provides the
precise meaning of the new features of the UCON model, such as the mutability of attributes
and the continuity of usage control decisions. Another contribution of this chapter is that
we give out a formalized specification of the UCON model which is built from these basic
constraints, such as authorization predicates, obligation actions and condition requirements.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we identify the motivation
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of our work in this paper and review the related technologies. Constraints in authorization
decisions, obligations and conditions are discussed in Section 5.3. Formalized specifica-
tions of usage control model are expressed with OCL in Section 5.4. Some related work is
reviewed in Section 5.5 and the summary is provided in Section 5.6.
5.2 MOTIVATION AND RELATED TECHNOLOGIES
Constraints in UCON are one of the most important components that have involved in the
principle motivations of usage analysis and design. Using OCL that has been used to express
constraints in analysis and design as an industrial standard constraints specification language,
we demonstrate that OCL can help us specify previously identified constraints at the system
design step.
5.2.1 USAGE CONTROL
UCON has recently received considerable attention as a promising alternative to traditional
access control models, such as access matrix [49], mandatory access controls (MAC) [22,
32], discretionary access control (DAC) and role-based access control (RBAC) [37, 84].
Usage control is used for access control in a pervasive environment. There are eight com-
ponents: subjects, subject attributes, objects, object attributes, rights, authorizations, obli-
gations, and conditions in the usage control model (see Figure 5.1). Subjects and Objects
are familiar concepts from traditional access control, and are used in their familiar sense in
this paper. A right represents access of a subject to an object, such as read or write. Sub-
ject and object attributes are properties that can be used during the access decision process.
Examples of subject attributes are identities, group names, roles, memberships, credits, etc.
Examples of object attributes are security labels, ownerships, classes, access control lists,
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Usage Decision Authorization (A)
Subjects (S) Rights (R) Objects (O)
Obligations (B) Conditions (C)
Subject Attributes Object Attributes
(ATT(S)) (ATT(O))
Figure 5.1: Components of UCON model
etc. In an online shop a price could be an object attribute, for instance, a particular e-book
may stipulate a 10 price for a ‘read’ right and a 15 price for a ‘print’ right.
Authorizations, obligations and conditions are decision factors employed by the usage
decision functions to determine whether a subject should be allowed to access an object with
a particular right. In addition to these three decision factors, modern information system
requires two other important properties called ‘continuity’ and ‘mutability’ as shown in Fig-
ure 5.2. In traditional access control, authorization is assumed to be done before access is
allowed (pre). However, it is quite reasonable to extend this for continuous enforcement by
evaluating usage requirements throughout usages (ongoing). the presence of ongoing deci-
sions is called the continuity of UCON. Mutability means that one or more subject or object
attribute values can be updated as side-effects of subjects’ actions. In the case where at-
tributes are mutable, updates can be done either before (pre), during (ongoing) or after (post)
usages shown in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Continuity and mutability properties of UCON
5.2.2 UNIFIED MODELING LANGUAGE AND OBJECT CONSTRAINTS LAN-
GUAGE
UML [82] is the industry-standard language for specifying, visualizing, constructing, and
documenting the artifacts of software systems. It simplifies the complex process of sys-
tem analysis and design and further software implementation. UML has become a standard
modeling language in the filed of software engineering.
OCL expressions are described within the context of an instance of a specific type. In an
OCL expression, the reserved word self is used to refer to the contextual instance. The type
of the context instance of an OCL expression is written with the context keyword, followed
by the name of the type. The label invar: declares the constraint to be an invariant constraint.
For example, suppose that employees work for a company and they are involved in projects.
These relationships can be modeled using the class model of the UML. If the context is
Company, then self refers to an instance of Company. The following shows an example of
OCL constraint expression describing a company that has more than 200 employees:
context Company invar:
self.employee! size > 200
The self.employee is a set of employees that is selected by navigating from Company
class to Employee class though an association. The “.” stands for a navigation. A property
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of a set is accessed by using an arrow “!” followed by the name of the property. A property
of the set of employees is expressed using a keyword ‘size’ in this example.
An OCL expression delivers a subset of a collection. That is, the OCL has special con-
structs to specify a selection from a specific collection. For example, the following OCL
expression specifies that the collection of employees whose age is over 50 is not empty:
context Company invar:
self.employee! select(age > 50)! notEmpty
The select takes an employee from self.employee and evaluates an expression (age> 50)
for the employee. If this evaluation result is true, then the employee is in the result set. More
examples can be reviewed in [82].
5.3 CONSTRAINTS IN UCON
Constraints are an important aspect of access control and are a powerful mechanism for
laying out a higher-level organizational policy. Consequently the specification of constraints
needs to be considered. This issue has received surprisingly little attention in the research
literature. Next we will illustrate the main constraints in UCON.
Authorization Constraints
In today’s highly dynamic environment, authorizations are predicates based on subject
and/or object attributes, which determine whether a subject should be allowed to access
an object with particular right. Before authorization, predicates on attributes have to be
satisfied. A predicate is a boolean-valued polynomially computable function built from a set
of a subject s’s and an object o’s attributes and constraints. The following examples show
how we can specify this type of constraints using OCL.
Example 1: The subject’s credit attribute value in current state of the system should be
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larger than $100.
context State invar:
self.attribute! subject.credit > $100
Obligation Constraints
In UCON, an obligation is an action that must be performed by a subject before or during
an access, such as, filling out a form before playing a licensed music file.





Conditions are environmental restrictions that have to be valid before or during a usage
process, such as system clock, location, system code, etc.
Example 3: A subject obtains a permission only when the system clock is in daytime.
context Obtain a permission invar:
self.systemclock.daytime = true
Mutability Constraints
Mutability means that subject and/or object attributes can be updated as the results of an
access. There are three kinds of updates: pre updates, on updates, and post updates. The
updating of attributes as a side-effect of subject activity is a significant extension of classic
access control where the reference monitor mainly enforces existing permissions.
Example 4: The subject’s current usage number of an object is increased by 1 at the
time of access and decreased by 1 at the end of access. The update of the object’s attribute
‘usageNum’ can be described as follow:
context Attributes(o) invar:
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self.pre update! exists( usageNum = ‘usageNum(o)+1’)
self.post update! exists( usageNum = ‘usageNum(o) 1’)
5.4 SPECIFYING USAGE CONTROL MODEL WITH OCL
In this section we present a formalized specification of usage control models which is built
from the basic components, such as authorization predicates and mutable attributes etc.
5.4.1 UCONpreA – PRE-AUTHORIZATION MODELS
Authorizations have been considered as the core of access control and extensively discussed
since the beginning of access control discipline. Traditionally, access control research has
focused on pre-authorizations in which a usage decision is made before a requested right
is exercised. UCONpreA models utilize these pre-authorizations for their usage decision
processes. In UCONpreA models, an authorization decision process is done before usage is
allowed. We begin with the UCONpreA0 which allows no updates of attributes.
context preA0 invar:
init: self.access = ‘requesting’
derive: if self.access = ‘permitaccess’
then self.preA(attr(s); attr(o); r) = true
else self.access = ‘denyaccess’
endif
while reqesting means the access has been generated and is waiting for the system’s
usage decision, where preA is a functional predicate that utilizes attr(s), attr(o), and right
r for usage decision making. We write ‘permitaccess’ to indicate that subject s is allowed
right r to object o. Else, ‘denyaccess’ indicates that the system rejects the access request.
CHAPTER 5. SPECIFYING USAGE CONTROL MODEL WITH OBJECT CONSTRAINT
LANGUAGE
Min Li Ph.D Dissertation - 87 of 167
The UCONpreA1 model is similar to UCONpreA0 except it takes pre update attributes into
account, i.e., let ‘attr:string = self.pre update! size()’ in the expression. We use the size
property on the set of pre updated attributes in preA1, where ‘size()> 1’ indicates that at
least subject’s or object’s attributes are pre updated.
context preA1 invar:
init: self.access = ‘requesting’
derive: let attr:string = self.pre update! size() in
if self.access = ‘permitaccess’
then
self.preA(attr(s); attr(o); r) = true and
self.pre update! size()> 1
else self.access = ‘denyaccess’
endif
The specification of UCONpreA3 is similar to that in UCONpreA0 except it adds post update
processes, i.e., let ‘attr:string = self.post update! size()’ in the expression.
Example 5: In a DRM pay-per-use application, a read access can be approved when
the user Alice’s credit is more than an ebook’s value. Before the access can be begin, an
update to Alice’s credit is performed.
context preA1 invar:
init: self.access = ‘application’
derive: let attr:string = self.pre update! size() in
if self.access = ‘read’
then self.attribute! Alice:credit  ebook:value and
self.pre update! exists (credit = Alice:credit  ebook:value! size()> 1)
else self.access = ‘denyaccess’
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endif
5.4.2 UCONonA – ONGOING-AUTHORIZATION MODELS
In UCONonA model, ongoing-authorizations have been seldom discussed in access con-
trol literature. By utilizing ongoing-authorization, monitoring is actively involved in us-
age decisions while a requested right is exercised. This kind of continuous control is use-
ful for relatively long-lived usage rights. In UCONonA, there are four detailed models.
UCONonA0 is an immutable ongoing-authorization model that has no update procedure in-
cluded. UCONonA1 is an ongoing-authorization model with optional pre-updates. UCONonA2
and UCONonA3 include ongoing updates and post updates respectively.
context onA0 invar:
init: self.access = ‘accessing’
derive: if self.onA(attr(s); attr(o); r) = false
then self.access = ‘revokeaccess’
else self.access = ‘endaccess’
endif
UCONonA model introduces an onA predicate instead of preA. Since there is no pre-
authorization , the requested access is always allowed. The ‘accessing’ means that the system
has permitted the access and the subject has accessed the object immediately after that. In
case certain attributes are changed and requirements are no long satisfied, a ‘revoke’ pro-
cedure is performed. We write ‘revokeaccess’ to indicate that right r of subject s to object
o is revoked and the ongoing access terminated. Else, ‘endaccess’ indicates that a subject
finishes the usage and ends the access.
The expressions of onA1, onA2 and onA3 are similar to that in onA0 except they add the
updating of attributes in the expression, i.e., pre update, on update, post update, respectively.
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Here, for simplicity we describe onA1 as follows.
context onA1 invar:
init: self.access = ‘accessing’
derive: let attr:string = self.pre update! size() in
if self.onA(attr(s); attr(o); r) = false
then
self.access = ‘revokeaccess’ and
self.pre update! size()> 1
else self.access = ‘endaccess’
endif
Example 6: Considering a limited number of simultaneous usages, each new access
request must be granted and there is only one access generated from a single user at any
time. When a new request is generated, one existing user’s ongoing access is revoked based
on the longest idle time. The policy can be specified as a combination policy of onA1, onA2
and onA3 as follows.
context onA invar:
let attr:string = self.update! size() in
init: self.access = ‘permitaccess’
derive:
(1) self.pre update! exists (accessingS = accessingS(o) [ fsg)
self.pre update! exists (idleTime = 0)
(2) if self.access = ‘accessing ^ idle’ then
self.on update! exists (idleTime = idleT ime(s) + 1)
(3) if self.attributes! subject.startTime= MaxidleT ime(object:accessingS)
then self.access = ‘revokeaccess’ and
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self.post update! exists (accessingS = accessingS(o)  fsg)
endif
whereMaxidleT ime(object:accessingS) is the largest idleT ime in the object’s accessingS
attribute. The first description is an onA1 rule specifying that whenever a subject tries to ac-
cess the object, there must be two pre-updates before the subject starts to access. The second
rule indicates the mutability of the subject attribute by saying that there must be a continuous
update of idleT ime whenever the status of subject is idle. The third rule specifies the revo-
cation is determined by the idleT ime, and the attribute accessingS is updated by removing
the subject.
5.4.3 UCONpreB – PRE-OBLIGATIONS MODELS
UCONpreB introduces pre-obligations that have to be fulfilled at the time of a request and
before access is allowed. The UCONpreB models consist of two steps. The first step is
to select required obligation elements for the requested usage. The getPreOBL function
represents the pre-obligations required for s to gain r access to o. Second step is to evaluate
whether the selected obligation elements have been fulfilled without any error (e.g., invalid
e-mail addresses). The preFulfilled predicate tells us if each of the required obligations is
true. In UCONpreB models, a request may require multiple pre-obligation elements to be
fulfilled. Suppose the set of pre-obligation elements is indicated by M which is based on
requests that consist of s; o and r.
context preB0 invar:
let M: Set= fgetPreOBL(s; o; r)g in
init: self.access = ‘requesting’
derive: if self.access = ‘permitaccess’
then M! select(mjself:preFulfilled = false)! is empty
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else self.access = ‘denyaccess’
endif
The expression (M! select(mjself:preFulfilled = false)! is empty) indicates that
all the required pre-obligation elements are fulfilled by using preFulfilled.
The specification of UCONpreB1 is similar to that in UCONpreB0 except that an pre update
action must be performed before ‘permitaccess’, i.e., let ‘attr:string = self.pre update !
size()’ in the expression.
context preB1 invar:
let M: Set= fgetPreOBL(s; o; r)g in
init: self.access = ‘requesting’
derive:
let attr:string = self.pre update! size() in
if self.access = ‘permitaccess’
then M! select(mjself:preFulfilled = false)! is empty and
self.pre update! size()> 1
else self.access = ‘denyaccess’
endif
The UCONpreB3 model is similar to UCONpreB0 except it adds post update processes.
Example 7: In an online electronic marketing system, in order to place an order, a cus-
tomer has to click a button to agree to the order policies. We define an action click agreement
as an obligation for each other, where the obligation subject is the same as the ordering sub-
ject, and the agree statement is the obligation object. A customer’s orderList is updated
by adding the ordered item after he/she places an order. This can be expressed with a preB3
policy as the following.
context preB3 invar:
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let M: Set= f(s; agree statement; order)g in
init: self.access = ‘requesting’
derive: if self.access = ‘permitaccess’
then M! select(mjself:preFulfilled = false)! is empty
self.post update! exists (orderList = orderList(s) [ fog)
else self.access = ‘denyaccess’
endif
5.4.4 UCONonB – ONGOING-OBLIGATIONS MODELS
UCONonB models are similar to UCONpreB models except that obligations have to be ful-
filled while rights are exercised. Ongoing-obligations may have to be fulfilled periodically
or continuously. In UCONonB models, there are four detailed models based on mutability
issues. UCONonB0 includes an ongoing-obligation predicate instead of a pre-obligations
predicate. UCONonB1 , UCONonB2 , and UCONonB3 are the same as UCONonB0 except
that they add pre-updates, ongoing-updates, and post-updates, respectively.
context onB0 invar:
let M: Set= fgetOnOBL(s; o; r)g in
init: self.access = ‘accessing’
derive:
if M! select(mjself:onFulfilled = false)! notempty
then self.access = ‘revokeaccess’
else self.access = ‘endaccess’
endif
Similar to preB, the setM shows the selection of required ongoing-obligation elements.
The specification (M ! select(mjself:onFulfilled = false) ! notempty) indicates that
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not all required ongoing-obligation elements are fulfilled by using onFulfilled.
The expressions of onB1, onB2 and onB3 are similar to that in onB0 except that they
add the updating of attributes in the expression, i.e., pre update, on update, post update,
respectively. Next, the description of onB1 is given for simplicity.
context onB1 invar:
let M: Set= fgetOnOBL(s; o; r)g in
init: self.access = ‘accessing’
derive:
let attr:string = self.pre update! size() in
if M! select(mjself:onFulfilled = false)! notempty
then self.access = ‘revokeaccess’ and
self.pre update! size()> 1
else self.access = ‘endaccess’
endif
5.4.5 UCONpreC – PRE-CONDITIONS MODEL
Conditions are environmental restrictions that have to be satisfied for usages. By utiliz-
ing conditions in usage decision process, UCONpreC can provide fine-grained controls on
usage. Unlike authorization and obligation models, condition models cannot be mutable.
UCONpreC introduces a pre-conditions predicate that has to be evaluated before the re-
quested rights are exercised.
context preC0 invar:
let M: Set= fgetPreCON(s; o; r)g in
init: self.access = ‘requesting’
derive: if self.access = ‘permitaccess’, then
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M! select(mjself:preConChecked = false)! is empty
else self.access = ‘denyaccess’
endif
In this specification, a set of relevant condition elementsM is selected based on a request
possibly using subject or object attributes. To allow a request, all of the selected condition
restrictions have to be evaluated by using preConChecked.
5.4.6 UCONonC – ONGOING-CONDITIONS MODEL
In many cases, environmental restrictions have to be satisfied while rights are in active use.
This could be supported within the UCONonC model. In UCONonC , usages are allowed
without any decision process at the time of requests. However, there is an ongoing-condition
predicate to check certain environmental statuses repeatedly throughout the usages.
context onC0 invar:
let M: Set= fgetOnCON(s; o; r)g in
init: self.access = ‘accessing’
derive:
if M! select(mjself:onConChecked = false)! notempty
then self.access = ‘revokeaccess’
else self.access = ‘endaccess’
endif
5.5 RELATED WORK
The development of access control models has experienced a long history. There are two
main approaches in this field. One is about traditional access control models, which have
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been discussed in the introduction. The other approach is about the research of temporal
access control models, which introduce the temporal attributes into traditional access control
with temporal logic. A temporal authorization model for database management systems was
first proposed by Bertino et al. [23, 24, 25]. In this model, a subject has permissions on an
object during some time intervals or a subject’s permission is temporally dependent on an
authorization rule. For example, a subject can access a file only for one week. Our specified
model is different: we consider the temporal characteristics in a single-usage period, with
mutable attributes of subject and object before, during, and after an access, that is, the tem-
poral properties are the result of the mutability of subject and object attributes, which change
due to the side effects of access and usages.
Joshi et al. [52] presented a generalized temporal RBAC model (GTRBAC) to specify
temporal constraints in role activation, user-role assignment, and role-permission assign-
ment. For example, a user can only activate a role for a particular duration. The concept of
temporal constraint is different from the mutability constraints of UCON, since it does not
have update actions. The dependency constraint in GTRBAC [51] is similar to the concept of
obligation in UCON, but the dependency is more like the implication relation between events
in GTRBAC, i.e., if an event happens, it triggers another event; while in UCON, obligations
are explicitly required actions to permit an access.
Bettini et al. [26, 27] presented concepts of provisions and obligation in policy manage-
ment: provisions are conditions or actions performed by a subject before an authorization
decision, while obligations are conditions or actions performed after an access. In this work,
we distinguish between conditions and obligations. All the actions that a subject has to per-
form before usage are regarded as obligations, while for future actions, we consider them
as the obligations for future usage requests or long-term obligations. Chomicki and Lobo
[28] investigate the conflicts and constraints of historical actions in policies. In their paper,
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actions are applications activities and constraints are expressed with linear-time temporal
connectors. In our paper, we specify obligations as actions required by an access and give
formal specification with OCL.
5.6 SUMMARY
This work has discussed the constraints in the UCON model and provide various kinds of
constraints representated with object constraint language. We have analyzed the constraints
in UCON such as decision actor constraints and mutability constraints etc. We also provide a
tool to precisely describe constraints for system designers and administrators. Furthermore,
we give out a formalized specification of the UCON model which is built from these basic
constraints, such as authorization predicates, obligation actions and condition requirements
etc. We show the flexibility and expressive capability of this model by specifying the core
models of UCON with extensive examples.





In this chapter, we devise a generalization boundary technique to balance privacy and in-
formation utilization, satisfying the requirements of both data providers and data users. We
propose a privacy-aware access control model, where formalized authorizations are defined
relating the permissible usage and specific generalization levels. Compared with traditional
access models, our access control model supports a much finer level of control based on “how
much information can be accessed for a certain user”. Trust-based decision and ongoing ac-
cess control mechanisms are designed to manage a valid access process at the pre-access and
ongoing-access stages, respectively. Finally, we describe the state transition architecture of
the privacy-aware access control model to demonstrate how the model works in practice.
The information in this chapter is based on a published paper [64].
6.1 INTRODUCTION
While current information technology enables people to carry out their business virtually at
any time in any place, it also provides the capability to store various types of information that
users reveal during their activities. Privacy concerns are fueled by an ever increasing list of
privacy violations, ranging from privacy accidents to illegal actions. Individuals are becom-
ing more reluctant to carry out business and transactions online potentially leading to many
enterprises losing a considerable amount of their profits. Also, enterprises that collect infor-
mation about individuals are in effect obligated to keep the collected information private and
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are required to control the use of such information. Thus, information stored in the databases
of an enterprise is not only a valuable property of the enterprise, but also a costly responsi-
bility. By demonstrating good privacy practices, many enterprises try to utilize information
analysis and knowledge extraction to provide better services to individuals without violating
individual privacy. Changes in legislation around the world and growing consumer attention
have changed attitudes towards security and privacy concerns for database systems. This
coincides with a substantial body of research on approaches for managing the negotiation of
personal information among customers and enterprises [96, 4, 90].
At the heart of protecting privacy is the principle of transparency. Transparency means
that when enterprises store data about customers they should disclose to customers what data
is being collected and how it is to be used; i.e. for what purpose data is being used and how
it is maintained. Starting from the landmark proposal for Hippocratic databases [3], most
privacy-aware technologies use purpose as a central concept around which privacy protec-
tion is built. Byun and Bertino [20] proposed a model based on a typical life-cycle of data
concerning individuals. The use of data generalization1 helps to significantly increase the
comfort level of the data providers. For example, many individuals may not be comfortable
with their date of birth being used. Suppose the enterprise promises its customers that this
information will be used only in a generalized form; e.g. (08/20/1980) will be generalized to
a less specific value (08/1980). This assurance can provide much comfort to many customers
and the ability to limit the level of allowed generalization could be valuable in terms of pri-
vacy. However over-generalization of data could make it useless; for instance, when address
information, such as 14 Regent Street, Toowoomba, Queensland, Australia, is used for some
specific data analysis tasks in relation to States in Australia, then the state “Queensland”
should be the maximal allowed generalization value. Therefore, the address information
1Data generalization refers to techniques that “replace a value with a less specific but semantically consistent
value.”
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generalized beyond the state could be useless. Hence the issue is how to determine whether
or not a certain generalization strategy provides a sufficient level of privacy and usability.
Technologies that can provide adequate solutions to this problem require a delicate bal-
ance between an individual’s privacy and data usability by enterprises. An important com-
ponent of database management systems that can help to address the above problem is an
access control model. Traditional access models, such as Mandatory Access Control (MAC),
Discretionary Access Control (DAC), and Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [86, 37], are
fundamentally inadequate in this respect. We believe that a new generation of privacy-aware
access control models that maximize data usability while minimizing disclosure of privacy
is needed. We are facing three challenges in building such a privacy-aware access control
model. The first challenge is that the comfort level of privacy varies from individual to indi-
vidual, and this requires fine-grained access control incorporating generalization techniques
with sufficient levels of privacy and usability. The second challenge is that privacy-oriented
access control models are mainly concerned with what data object is being used for what
purpose(s) rather than which user is performing what action on what data object as in the
traditional access control models. The third challenge is how to make the access control
technology in a trustworthy fashion, when the data provider and the requester are unknown
to each other.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we identify the motivation
of our work in this paper. We propose the privacy-aware access control model in Section 6.3
and discuss the access control process in Section 6.4. In Section 6.5, we illustrate the state
transitions. We show our experimental results in Section 6.6 and provide a brief survey of
related work in Section 6.7. Finally, we summary this chapter in Section 6.8.
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6.2 MOTIVATION
Following [20], the actual data items2 are preprocessed before being stored. The pre-processing
takes the following form: Each data item is generalized and stored according to a multilevel
organization, where each level corresponds to a specific privacy level. Intuitively, data for a
higher privacy level requires a higher degree of generalization. Let us briefly first describe
the terminologies used in this process:
 Data Provider: Data provider refers to the subject to whom the stored data is related. We
denote S as the set of data providers.
 Data Users: Data users are individuals who access or receive data. Data users are required
in a privacy context, as privacy policies will depend on the relationship between the indi-
vidual requesting data and the individual to whom the data is related to. For example, one
type of data users might be physician while another might be primary care physician.
We denote U as the set of data users.
 Privilege: Some privacy policies make distinctions about who can perform activities based
on the action being performed. For example, a policy might state that anyone in the
company can create a customer record, but that only certain data users are allowed to
read that record. We denote Priv as the set of privileges.
 Purpose: Data access requests are made for a specific purpose or purposes. This represents
how the data is going to be used by the recipient. For example, the data may be used for
Marketing or Delivery purposes. We denote P as the set of purposes.
 Generalization Level: Generalization level refers to what extent the data items have been
generalized. We denote GL as the set of private levels, which consists of Low, Medium,
2Data item refers to the type of data being collected (i.e., attributes), such as Name, Address. In this
paper, we denote D as the set of data items.
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Name Address Income Admin Marketing Delivery
L Alice Park L 123 First St.,Seattle,WA L 45,000
M A. Park M Seattle,WA M 40K-60K fL,M,Hg fM,H,Hg fM,M,Mg
H A.P. H WA H Under 100K
Table 6.1: Privacy information and Metadata
Name Address Income Delivery
A. Park Seattle,WA 40K-60K fM,M,Mg
Table 6.2: Private information for Delivery purpose
High, and Maximal generalization level, denoted as L, M , H and ML. For example,
a Low generalization level on Address means that the address information can be used
without any modification.
Table 6.1 illustrates some fractional records and privacy requirements stored in a con-
ceptual database relation. Note that each data item is stored at three different privacy levels,
Low;Medium;High. Take the address data as an example: the entire address is regarded
as Low, city and state are at Medium and state at High. Admin and Marketing are meta-
data columns storing the set of privacy levels of data for Admin and Marketing purposes
respectively. Further, a data provider submits his/her privacy requirements, which specify
permissible usages of each data item and a level of privacy for each usage. For instance,
fM, H, Hg under Marketing indicates that for the Marketing purpose data users can only
access Name at the Medium privacy level while accessing Address and Income at the
High level.
We can see that the access to each data item is strictly governed by the data provider’s re-
quirements. Before data access, authorizations on each data item have already been granted
through the permissible usage requirements. However, different people may have different
feelings about their information being used for some purposes. For instance, some con-
sumers may feel that it is acceptable to disclose their purchase history or browsing habits
in return for better services; others may feel that revealing such information violates their
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privacy. Differences in individuals suggest that access control models should be able to
maximize information utility, which may be neglected by data providers although wanted by
data users. For example, if a data provider selects fM, M, Mg on Name, Address, Income
for Delivery purpose, (i.e., the data user has been authorized to access Name, Address,
and Income only in medium level shown in Table 6.2) then, the information could be use-
less for the data user who wants to fulfill the delivery purpose because full name and address
are necessary information for delivery. Further, the fM, M, Mg selection may increase the
chance of disclosure of the unnecessary information Income since the more people who
know, the more likely it would be disclosed. Authorizations incurred by this selection could
not protect data privacy (e.g., Income, to some degree) nor maintain data usability.
To solve this problem, we need metrics that methodologically measure the privacy and
usability of generalized data. It is necessary to devise efficient generalization techniques that
satisfy the requirements of both data providers and data users. In this paper, we propose
a privacy-aware access control model with generalization boundaries, which can maximize
data usability and minimize privacy disclosure. In particular, we
 Formalize the authorizations with the specific purpose and generalization levels speci-
fied on each data item and investigate two other factors, obligations and conditions.
 Propose a trust-based decision policy with trust evaluation techniques to handle access
security with regard to a requester’s trust before data access and design authorization and ac-
cess functions to handle access security with regard to the retention period and generalization
level during data accessing.
 Study the state transition of our proposed privacy-aware access control model and il-
lustrate how the model works in practice.
 Evaluate our proposed access control model on both real-life and synthetic data sets to
show its efficiency and effectiveness.
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6.3 PRIVACY-AWARE ACCESS CONTROL MODEL
By using data generalization, data providers can specify their privacy requirements using a
privacy level for each data item. Data for a higher privacy level requires a higher degree of
generalization; i.e., each privacy level is accompanied with a generalization level. However,
over-generalized data may render data of little value or useless. In this section, we introduce
a privacy-aware access control model with generalization boundaries.
6.3.1 GENERALIZATION BOUNDARY
In order to specify a generalization boundary, we introduce the concept of a maximum al-
lowed generalization level that is associated with each data item. This concept is used to
express to what extent the data user thinks the data item could be generalized, such that the
resultant generalized data item would still be useful. Limiting the level of generalization for
the data item is necessary for various usage of the data. For instance, when data related to
Australian states is used for some specific analysis tasks, the data user will select the level
corresponding to the states as the maximal allowed generalization level. Address informa-
tion generalized beyond the Australia state level could be useless. In this case, the only
solution would be to ask the data provider to make a decreased level of generalization until
the generalized data satisfies the maximum allowed generalization level requirement (i.e., no
address is generalized further than the Australian state).
Definition 6.1. Let D be the set of data attributes and P be the set of purposes. For each
data attribute d 2 D and purpose p 2 P , the maximum allowed generalization level of d
under purpose p, denoted by MAGLel(d; p), satisfies that the data attribute d is permitted
to be generalized only up toMAGLel(d; p).
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Name Address Income Delivery
L Alice Park L 123 First St.,Seattle,WA L 45,000 fMAGLel(Name, Delivery),
M A. Park M Seattle,WA M 40K-60K MAGLel(Address, Delivery),
H A.P. H WA H Under 100K MLg
ML * ML * ML *
Table 6.3: Generalization boundaries for Delivery purpose
Name Address Income Delivery
Alice Park 123 First St., Seattle,WA * fL,L,MLg
Table 6.4: Ideal information for Delivery purpose
We assume that the generalization level is equal to the privacy level in this paper. The
maximal generalization level, denoted ML, corresponds to generalizing a data value to .
For simplicity of discussion, we only consider the generalization levels: low (L), medium
(M ), high (H) and (ML). For example, if D = fName, Address, Incomeg, P = fAdmin,
Marking, Deliveryg, then we can define the maximum allowed generalization level ofName
under purpose Delivery,MAGLel(Name;Delivery) = L.
Note that the maximum allowed generalization level of the data could be different for dif-
ferent purposes. For example, the maximum allowed generalization level of Address could
be Low for Delivery purpose, whereas it may be High for Marketing purpose. Usually,
for a certain purpose, the data user only has generalization restrictions for some necessary
data items; e.g., there should be restrictions on Name and Address for Delivery purpose
but no restrictions on Income. If for a particular data item there are no any restrictions with
respect to its generalization, then the maximal generalization level ML is specified for the
usage of this data. In this case, the requirement of providing sufficient privacy and usability
is satisfied by the following description.
Definition 6.2. Let P be the set of access purposes and D be the set of data items, for each
purpose p 2 P , the set Np  D denotes all necessary data attributes to fulfill the purpose p.
The privacy-aware generalization boundaries for p satisfies the following:
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 for 8d 2 Np, the data attribute d is permitted to be generalized only up toMAGLel(d; p);
 for 8d =2 Np and d 2 D, the data attribute d is permitted to be generalized up toML.
For instance, if D = fName, Address, Incomeg and P = fAdmin, Marking, Deliv-
eryg, then since the full name and address are necessary to fulfill the Delivery purpose,
NDelivery = fName, Addressg. Table 6.3 shows the example of privacy-aware general-
ization boundaries for the Delivery purpose. Because of Name;Address 2 NDelivery,
the generalizations on Name and Address are only permitted up to MAGLel(Name;
Delivery) and MAGLel(Address;Delivery) (i.e., Low and Low), respectively. On the
other hand, for Income, there are no requirements with respect to its generalization, since
Income =2 NDelivery, so the maximal generalization level ML is specified for the usage of
Income. The information obtained by the data user is shown in Table 6.4.
The above example shows that our proposed generalization boundary strategy can maxi-
mize data usability while, at the same time, minimizing disclosure of data privacy. Moreover,
the specific generalization boundaries actually describe the permissible usage of each data
item, and the permissible usage further grants the data user to access each data item from a
specific generalization level. Such a finer level access control could satisfy the requirements
of both data providers and data users. Now the issue is how to build a formal access control
model with specific generalization boundaries that can balance data privacy and usability.
We discuss this question in detail in the next section.
6.3.2 PRIVACY-AWARE AUTHORIZATIONS
Authorization is the act of checking to see if a data user has the proper permission to access
the particular data or perform a particular action. In addition to the traditional authorization
factors, data items, data users and privileges, all authorizations in this paper are extended to
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include the specific purpose and generalization level on each data item.
Definition 6.3. A generalized authorization is a 5-tuple (u; d; priv; p; gl), where u 2 U ,
d 2 D, priv 2 Priv, p 2 P , gl 2 GL.
As previously mentioned, D is the set of data items. The tuple (u; d; priv; p; gl) states
that the data user u has been authorized to perform priv on the data item d under general-
ization level gl for purpose p. For example, the tuple (Tom; address; access; delivery; L)
denotes that Tom was authorized with privilege access of the customer’s address at Low
generalization level for the delivery purpose.
Moreover, personal information is retained only as long as necessary for the fulfillment
of the purpose for which it has been collected. Retention period refers to how long the
information is stored. For example, if the retention period forName is one month, the name
information can only be retained for one month. We use time intervals to describe retention
period, e.g., [12/02/2008, 12/03/2008]. We denote T as the set of time intervals. If a certain
data item was collected for a set of purposes, it is kept for the limited retention period of the
purpose. We refer to an authorization together with its usage time as a temporal generalized
authorization. A time interval is also associated with each authorization, imposing lower and
upper bounds to the potential usage.
Definition 6.4. A temporal generalized authorization is a 6-tuple (t; u; d; priv; p; gl), where
t 2 T , u 2 U , d 2 D, priv 2 Priv, p 2 P , gl 2 GL.
A tuple ([ta; tb]; u; d; priv; p; gl) states that the data user u has been authorized to perform
priv on the data item d in the generalization level gl for the purpose p in the time interval
[ta; tb]. We denote AU as the set of temporal generalized authorizations and au() as the
function used to extract the element(s)  in an authorization au 2 AU . A temporal gen-
eralized authorization au = ([12=06=2008; 10=08=2008]; T om; income; read; admin;M),
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means that between June 12, 2008 and August 10, 2008, Tom was authorized the privilege
to read the customer’s income at the generalization levelMedium for the admin purpose.
Here, au(t) refers to the time interval [12/06/2008, 10/08/2008] and au(u; d; priv; p) re-
turns to the tuple (Tom, income, read, admin).
6.3.3 AUTHORIZATION SPECIFICATION
An authorization is an approval of a particular mode of access to one or more objects in the
system. Observe that in a group of authorization assignments, two authorization assignments
may interact with each other when they share the same user, same data and same action. Pur-
poses mentioned in an authorization naturally have a hierarchical relationships among them.
For instance, a group of purposes such as direct-marketing and third-party marketing can be
represented by a more general purpose, marketing. More specific authorizations may deal
with more specific purposes that fall under the domain of a high-level purpose. This sug-
gests that purpose can be organized according to the hierarchical relations to simplify their
management. Mathematically, a purpose hierarchy is represented as a tree. Each purpose
(except the root purpose) has exactly one parent purpose and there are no cycles. A parent
node represents a more general purpose than those represented by its children nodes. Thus
the hierarchy of purposes can be intended as a grouping of more particular purposes into
more general ones. The same argument also could apply to generalization levels. General-
ization refers of replacing the actual value of the attribute with a less specific, more general
value which is faithful to the original [94, 92, 93]. For example, the name ‘Carol Jones’
can be generalized to a less specific value ‘C. Jones’ or further generalized to ‘C.J.’. As
for purposes hierarchies, a generalization hierarchy is represented as a tree structure. The
meaning associated with the generalization hierarchy is analogous to the one mentioned for
purpose hierarchies. Here, we use operation \  " to indicate the dominance relationship in
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the purpose hierarchy and generalization hierarchy.
Explicit(implicit) authorization: The introduction of hierarchies of purpose and gen-
eralization level with a retention period lead us to get two types of authorizations, called
explicit authorizations and implicit authorizations.
Definition 6.5. Let au1 = (t1; u1; d1; priv1; p1; gl1) and au2 = (t2; u2; d2; priv2; p2; gl2) be
two authorization in AU . We say that au1 is an explicit authorization of au2 (or au2 is an
implicit authorization of au1) only if one of the following conditions satisfies:
 (t1  t2) ^ (u1 = u2) ^ (d1 = d2) ^ (priv1 = priv2) ^ (p1 = p2) ^ (gl1 = gl2)
 (t1 = t2) ^ (u1 = u2) ^ (d1 = d2) ^ (priv1 = priv2) ^ (p1  p2) ^ (gl1 = gl2)
 (t1 = t2) ^ (u1 = u2) ^ (d1 = d2) ^ (priv1 = priv2) ^ (p1 = p2) ^ (gl1  gl2)
For example, let au1; au2; : : : ; au9 be authorizations, where
au1 = ([9AM; 5PM ]; T om; email; read;Marking;M),
au2 = ([9AM; 3PM ]; T om; email; read;Marking;M),
au3 = ([9AM; 3PM ]; T om; email; read; Third  party Marking,M)
au4 = ([9AM; 3PM ]; T om; email; read; Third  party Marking, H),




Figure 6.1: Authorization tree
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Conflicting authorizations: Complex environments, such as large enterprises, usually
have to comply with complex security and privacy policies. As such, it is possible that
the more complex a security policy is, the larger the probability that such policy contains
inconsistent and conflicting parts is. In particular, authorization assignments could conflict
because of new requirements, new regulations, or just human mistakes.
Consider the following authorization assignments:
au1 =([9AM, 5PM], Bank manager, loan, approve, Marking, Low)
au2 =([9AM, 5PM], Bank manager, loan, fund, Marking, Low).
Notice that there are different privileges related to the same user working on the same data
in the generalization level for the purpose in the time interval. A tricky issue here is that the
privileges of approving a loan in a bank and that of funding a loan are conflicting. Therefore,
these two authorizations conflict with each other since they have conflicting privileges.
Definition 6.6. Let au1 = (t1; u1; d1; priv1; p1; gl1) and au2 = (t2; u2; d2; priv2; p2; gl2) be
two authorization in AU . We say that au1 and au2 are conflicting only if priv1 and priv2 are
conflicting.
6.4 ACCESS CONTROL PROCESS
After each data is granted with authorizations according to different purposes, an access
request is needed to access the data items. In this paper, we assume that each access request
is associated with an access time and a specific purpose. It is not trivial for a system to
correctly infer the purpose of a query as the systemmust correctly deduce the actual intention
of database users.
Definition 6.7. An access request is a 5-tuple (t; u; d; priv; p) where t 2 T is the time when
the access is requested, u 2 U is the data user who requires the access, d 2 D is the data
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item to be accessed, priv 2 Priv is a privilege exercised on the data, and p 2 P is the
purpose for which the data is going to be used.
The tuple ([ta; tb]; u; d; priv; p) states that the data user u requests to perform priv on the
data item d for purpose p in the time interval [ta; tb]. We denoteR as the set of access requests
and for an access request r 2 R, r() refers to the element(s)  in an access request r. For
example, the access purpose r = ([10=07=2008; 20=07=2008]; T om; income; read; admin)
means that between July 10, 2008 and July 20, 2008, Tom requests to read the customer’s
income information for the admin purpose. Here, r(t) refers to the time interval [10/07/2008,
20/07/2008].
Under a request, traditional access process refers to a general way of controlling access to
data items and makes authorization decisions based on the identity of the resource requester.
Unfortunately, when the resource owner and the requester are unknown to one another, ac-
cess control based on identity may be ineffective. Access control technology can be used as
a starting point for managing personal identifiable information (PII) in a trustworthy fash-
ion. It is important that data items are accessed by persons who are trusted, and this requires
that trust-based decisions should be made by data providers according to the data user’s trust
value. Next, we discuss the management of a valid access process through the trust-based
decision policy.
6.4.1 TRUST-BASED DECISION MECHANISM
Trust means the liability and trustworthiness of a trusted agent’s behavior. There are two
approaches to obtaining an agent’s trust: experience by interacting with the agent, and rec-
ommendation of other agents [106]. In this paper, we evaluate the trust value in three steps
(as show in Figure 6.2): (1) Calculate the trust value based on histories; (2) Calculate the
trust value from recommendators; (3) Combine the observed trust values from histories and
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1. Calculate trust value
based on histories
2. Calculate trust value
based on recommentations
3. Combine observed history and recommendation
database
Figure 6.2: Trust evaluation
recommendations.
Step 1: Calculate trust based on histories.
Let m denotes the total number of transactions performed by a data user u during the
given period, and S(u; i) denote the satisfaction degree of the participating agent in u’s i-
th transaction, S(u; i) 2 [0; 1]. If the transaction context factor of u’s i-th transaction is
TF (u; i), then u’s trust can be evaluated by direct experience as follows:
T1(u) =
Pm
i=1 S(u; i) TF (u; i)Pm
i=1 TF (u; i)
(6.1)
Here, TF (u; i) 2 (0; 1) is the weight to indicate the influence of a transaction on trust
value. If the value of TF (u; i) is large, the transaction has more influence on trust value.
Further, if a data user u behaves in a satisfactory manner in all related transactions, i.e.
S(u; i) = 1 for every i, then u can be regarded as completely trustworthy, i.e. T (u) = 1.
Step 2: Calculate trust based on recommendations.
Now we consider the situation of obtaining u’s trust from others’ recommendation. Let n
denote the total number of the recommendations, and P (u; j) 2 (0; 1) denote the normalized
amount of satisfaction of recommendation for data user u in its j-th transaction. TP (u; j) 2
(0; 1) denotes the weight of j-th transaction, the recommendation-based trust value can be
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Time S(u; i) TF (u; i) P (u; i) TP (u; i)
1st 0.8 0.4 0.7 0.3
2nd 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.5
3rd 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.4
4th 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.6








j=1 P (u;j)TP (u;j)Pn
j=1 TP (u;j)
t 0:6
T (u) =  T1(u) + (1  ) T2(u) t 0:68 ( = 0:6)




j=1 P (u; j) TP (u; j)Pn
j=1 TP (u; j)
(6.2)
Step 3: Merge history-based trust with recommendations.
Now we consider both the trust value from contacting with data user u and the trust value
from others’ recommendations. Choose a power  2 (0; 1), then we can calculate u’s trust
as follows:
T (u) =  T1(u) + (1  ) T2(u) (6.3)
The above method for calculating a data user’s trust combines the trust information based
on the past experiences in interacting with this data user and other’s recommendations, and
considers the influence of a transaction context. With this approach, we can obtain the data
user’s trust value, which is assigned in the range [0; 1].
Table 6.5 details an example on how to calculate a data user’s trust value, where five
transaction behaviors are recorded and recommended. The satisfaction degree from partic-
ipating agents and commentators are given under S(u; i). According to formulas (1) and
(2), we can get the trust value T1(u) t 0:7 based on histories and T2(u) t 0:6 based on
recommendations. Combining the two values gives the total trust value T (u) t 0:68 when
the power  is chosen on 0.6.
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The data user’s trust status is dynamic. An agent who once behaved well might subse-
quently behave maliciously. So a data user’s trust value is only valid for a period of time,
and it should be updated timely. Now assume that a data user requests to read a data item.
The data accessible to the request normally depends on whether the requester’s trust value is
higher than the data provider’s trust threshold for reading the data. Different accesses or ser-
vices require participating users with different trust status. For example, a payment service
may require that the parties are highly reliable, while ordinary file share service has a lower
requirement for an agent’s trust. Write access to a file needs a higher trust degree than read
access to the same file, and the access to a confidential file requires a higher degree of trust
than access to an ordinary file.
In our model, the data provider’s trust threshold is defined as the minimum trust value for
obtaining operation permission. Access is permitted only when the requester’s trust degree
is higher than the data provider’s trust threshold. Conversely, when a data requester’s trust
degree is less than the data provider’s trust threshold for an operation, the data requester will
be prohibited from performing the operation.
The trust-based decision is described as follow:
Let S, U , D, Priv be the set of data providers, data requester (users), data items, and
operations. Then
PD  Priv D denotes the operations on data items
TT S : SPD ! [0; 1] (The data provider’s trust threshold for performing an operation
on a data item)
T U : U  PD ! [0; 1] (A data requester’s trust degree for performing an operation on
a data item)
F : S  U  PD ! f0; 1g (Trust-based decision)
In a trust-based decision, F : S  U  PD ! f0; 1g denotes a mapping from the data
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requester’s operation permission on the data item to the set f0; 1g. Here 1 denotes that access
is permitted and 0 denotes that access is denied.
When a data requester requests to perform an operation on a data item, the access control
system judges whether the trust degree of the data requester is higher than the data provider’s
trust threshold or not, and then decides to map the access permission to 0 or 1. That is,
8s 2 S; u 2 U; pd 2 PD
F (s; u; pd) = T U(u; pd)  TT S(s; pd)
If the trust degree of data requester u for performing operation on d is not less than the
data provider’s trust threshold, the access permission is mapped to 1 and access is permitted;
otherwise, access permission is mapped to 0 and access is denied. This can be seen as an
instance of the trust enhanced security model and framework recently proposed in [67].
6.4.2 ONGOING ACCESS CONTROL MECHANISM
The above trust-based decision mechanism handles access security before access, but does
not consider the authorization of data provider or data items’ security sensitivity during the
data usage. In the process of access control management, the ongoing access control mech-
anism is needed in order to achieve an efficient access control management.
As far as an authorization is concerned, the first step is to find all valid authorizations
under the request. This is checked by the valid authorization function.
Authorization check function: The valid authorization function is used to judge whether
the current authorization au is valid. It can be expressed as follows:
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G(r) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
au if (r(u) = au(u)) ^ (r(d) = au(d)) ^ (r(priv) = au(priv))
^(r(p) = au(p)) ^ (r(t)  au(t))
 others
Here au 2 AU , and G(r) returns a set of valid authorizations. Except for checking the
same data user to perform the same privileges on the same data items for the same purpose,
the period constraint of an authorization plays an important role. If the request access time is
within the retention period, it refers to the authorization as valid, otherwise, the authorization
is invalid.
However, a valid authorization function is not enough for an access request, since it only
checks whether an authorization exists in the current AU from the angle of the retention
period. Besides that, the generalization level decides whether the access of the request is
valid according to the current authorizations. Therefore, a valid access function is needed
conveniently. Here, we use r(gl) to indicate the generalization level that the request is going
to access. If there exists a valid authorization satisfying r(gl) = au(gl) (where au(gl) refers
to the generalization level in this authorization) the access is permitted, otherwise, the access
is rejected.
Access check function: The valid access function can be expressed as follows:
F (r) =
8>>>><>>>>:
true 9au 2 G(r); r(gl) = au(gl)
false others
where r is an access request. If F (r) is true, the access is valid. Otherwise, it is invalid.
CHAPTER 6. PRIVACY-AWARE ACCESS CONTROL WITH GENERALIZATION
BOUNDARIES
Min Li Ph.D Dissertation - 116 of 167
After a data user submits an access request r and F (r) is true, the user is permitted to access
the data. After a data user submits an access request r and F (r) is true, the user is permitted
to access the data. During the process of access, there are three kinds of situations that need
to be considered. If a requested authorization tuple is a time independent authorization, then
the authorization au is invoked. If it is a temporal authorization, when the time exceeds
the retention time, the au is illegal. If the data item being accessed is not in the same
generalization level, access is rejected. The pseudo code of the ongoing access control policy
is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Access control(AU , r)
Input: an access request r and the set of current
temporal generalized authorizations AU
Let G(r) = faujau 2 AUg; /*use the valid authorization function to return a set of
authorization tuples, and then judge whether the authorization is valid*/
If G(r) == 
return false; /*This authorization does not exist*/
else if r(t) * au(t), for 8au 2 G(r)
return false; /*No legal Authorization*/;
else if
let k = F (r); /*use the valid access function to return a boolean value, with which
to judge whether the access is valid.*/
if r(gl) 6= au(gl), for 8au 2 G(r)
then k == false
return false; /*The access is rejected’*/
else
k == true
return true. /*The access is succeeded’*/
6.5 STATE TRANSITIONS
In previous sections, the privacy-aware access control model has been discussed in detail. In
this section, the state transition of the proposed access control model is given.
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In our privacy-aware access control model, the most important thing is that all authoriza-
tions are derived from the permissible usage of each data item. By applying data general-
ization boundary techniques on each data item, authorizations for a user to access data items
in specific generalization levels are specified. Three different attributes are required to meet
these authorizations:
 The time interval. This includes the start time and end time for which access is permitted.
At the end time, the privilege for using data items is revoked.
 The validity period. Access to a data item can be permitted only during the valid period
of usage.
 Generalization level. The data item can only be accessed under the authorized generaliza-
tion level.
The operations in the authorizations are to grant/revoke privileges to/from data users.
Privileges are revoked under the following two situations:
(1) Revocation by time interval if the time interval of authorizations has expired.
(2) Revocation by generalization level if the data item is accessed at the wrong generaliza-
tion level.
Further, an administrator of the system can make a forced revocation decision. For ex-
ample, if a security administrator notices that a data user often sends many access requests
without using services, the administrator may take actions on this user, such as revoking his
authorization to prevent denial of service (DoS) attacks.
In the practical access control process, authorizations are assumed to be done before
access is allowed (pre-check). However, it is quite reasonable to extend this for continuous
CHAPTER 6. PRIVACY-AWARE ACCESS CONTROL WITH GENERALIZATION
BOUNDARIES





























Figure 6.3: The state transition of privacy-aware access control model
enforcement by evaluating usage requirements throughout usage (on-going). The presence
of on-going decisions is called the continuity. In the pre-access stage, we need to check
whether the requester’s trust degree is higher than the data provider’s trust threshold and
the required obligations and conditions are satisfied. In the ongoing-access stage, we need to
check whether the valid authorization and access functions are satisfied. The on-going access
may be revoked if the security policies are not satisfied. The pre-access decision policy and
ongoing access control policy combined together construct a secure protection system. The
state transition of privacy-aware access control actions is given in Figure 6.3. The states and
actions in Figure 6.3 are explained bellow.
(1) Initial: the initial state of the metadata.
(2) Data generalization: replacing a data value with a less specific but semantically consis-
tent value.
(3) Generalization boundaries: restricting the maximum allowed generalization level of each
data item.
(4) Permissible usage: the type of potential data usage (i.e., purpose).
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(5) Authorization: granting privileges of service to data users if data users meet authoriza-
tion requirements of the system.
(6) Access request: a user request to access digital objects.
(7) Trust evaluation: checking whether the requester is trustworthy or not.
(8) Pre-access check: checking whether the trust threshold is satisfied.
(9) Permitted and denied: if the requester is trustworthy, the access to data items is permit-
ted; otherwise, denied.
(10) Valid authorization check: checking whether the requested access time is in the valid
retention period.
(11) Continued and revoked: if the time interval has not expired during the valid period, an
access to data items is continued; otherwise, it is revoked.
(12) Valid access check: checking the accessed generalization level of the data item.
(13) Revoke privilege and endaccess: if the data item is accessed at a wrong generalization
level, the system will revoke the privileges.
(14) Deny, Revoke and End: three final states. Deny is the state of refusing to access without
revoking privileges. Revoke is the state after the action of revoke privileges, while End
is the state after the action of endaccess.
From the analysis of state transitions in a privacy-aware access control, it is clear that an
access is not a simple action, but consists of a sequence of actions and active tasks.
CHAPTER 6. PRIVACY-AWARE ACCESS CONTROL WITH GENERALIZATION
BOUNDARIES
Min Li Ph.D Dissertation - 120 of 167
6.6 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATIONS
The main goals of the experiments are two-fold. First, we study the performance and storage
overheads of our proposed access control model. We consider the impact of the number
of attributes accessed and the number of generalization levels on the execution time and
storage overheads, and we also examine the scalability of our approach by experimenting
with relations of different cardinalities. Second, we investigate the effectiveness of our model
in terms of disclosure rate, which is a novel metric defined to measure to what extent the
access control models can protect sensitive information disclosure.
Experimental setup: We employ two data sets in our experimental evaluations. For eval-
uating the performance and storage overheads, we adopt a real-world data set CENSUS,
downloadable at http://www.ipums.org, which contains the personal information of
500K American adults. The data set has 9 discrete attributes summarized in Table 6.6. From
CENSUS, we create one set of micro tables, in order to examine the influence of dimension-
ality and the impact of cardinality. The set has 6 tables, denoted as SAL-10K,    , SAL-60K,
respectively. Specifically, SAL-n (10K  n  60K) indicates the number of records ran-
domly sampled from CENSUS data set, and each record consists of nine attributes shown
in Table 6.6. We evaluate the execution time of our approach by varying the cardinality of
the data sets, the number of attributes and the number of generalization levels. We adopt
the peak memory to measure the storage overheads, which indicates the most memory used
during the implementation of our method.
To evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed access control model, we generate a syn-
thetic data set with 50K records, and each record contains 1000 numeric attributes with the
values randomly chosen from [0,1]. In this set of experiments, we set the number of general-
ization levels to be three, being High(H), Medium(M) and Low(L). For the implementation,
we vary the portion of the attributes with different access levels and investigate their impact
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Table 6.6: Summary of attributes


































Figure 6.4: Time and space complexity when data percentage varies; (a) The running time
when data percentage varies; (b) Peak memory when data percentage varies.
on the effective measurement disclosure rate. In order to reduce randomness, we run each
test 500 times for each data and use the average to mark the graph.
Performance: Figures 6.4(a) and 6.5(a) show the computation overhead of our proposed pri-
vacy aware access control model with generalization boundaries. In this set of experiments,
the computation is run through data sets SAL-10K,    , SAL-60K, the default number of
attributes accessed is nine, and the generalization hierarchy is set to have three levels. As
shown in Figure 6.4(a), the computation overhead increases as the number of records grows.
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Figure 6.5: Time and space complexity when the number of attributes varies; (a) The running
time when the number of attributes varies; (b) Peak memory when the number of attributes
varies.
As expected, the performance becomes poorer as the cardinality of the data set increases.
Figure 6.5(a) plots the effect of the number of attributes on the execution time. The result
is expected since the cost of computing increases with more dimensions. Figure 6.6(a) de-
scribes the effect of the number of generalization levels on the computation overhead. From
the figure, we can see that the running time is almost steady while varying the number of
levels in the generalization hierarchy.
Storage overhead: Figures 6.4(b) and 6.5(b) display the space overhead of our proposed
access control model. As shown in Figures 6.4(b) and 6.5(b), the storage overhead increases
when the number of records grows and the number of accessed attributes increases. This is
because more data records or more data dimensions lead to higher volume of memory con-
sumed. Figure 6.6(b) shows the memory usage when varying the number of generalization
levels. From the graph, the more levels are included in each generalization hierarchy, the
more memory is needed to store them, since the more levels there are, the more fine-grained
the information becomes on each level, which enlarges the total memory usage.
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Figure 6.6: Time and space complexity when the number of generalization levels varies; (a)
The running time when the number of generalization levels varies; (b) Peak memory when
the number of generalization levels varies.
Effectiveness: Having verified the efficiency of our technique, we proceed to test its effec-
tiveness. In this set of experiments, we use the disclosure rate to measure the effectiveness
of our proposed access control model with generalization boundaries. We are going to use
H , M and L to denote High, Medium and Low level in the classification of the generaliza-
tion boundaries. Recall our privacy-aware access control model, if a data requester provides
an access request, the access to each attribute is specified with generalization boundaries.
Suppose there are n attributes in the database, among which there are nH attributes which
are generalized to High level, nM attributes are generalized to Medium level, and nL at-
tributes are generalized to Low level, where nH + nM + nL = n. In this case, the requester
could totally access information in nH + 2nM + 3nL levels, which indicates the number
of secure accesses. Consider the situation where there is no specification of generaliza-
tion boundaries, for each attribute, the data requester could access any three-level informa-
tion. Then there would be 3(nH + nM + nL) accesses, and among those, there will be
3(nH + nM + nL)   (nH + 2nM + 3nL) insecure accesses. Thus, we define the disclosure
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Figure 6.7: Disclosure rate comparison when varying (a) the number of H levels; (b) the
number ofM levels; (c) the number of L levels.
rate as 1   nH+2nM+3nL
3(nH+nM+nL)
. The lower the rate is, the more secure the access control model
would be.
The results are shown in Figure 6.7. Figure 6.7(a) displays the disclosure rate by varying
the portion of L from 10% to 90%. From the graph, we can see that the disclosure rate is
decreasing as the amount of L increases. This is expected, since the more the L level is
specified in the generalization boundary, the less insecure accesses there are and the lower
the disclosure rate is. Figure 6.7(b) describes the disclosure rate by varyingM from 10% to
90%. The graph shows that the disclosure rate almost remains unchanged with the increased
portion of M . Figure 6.7(c) reports the effect of H on the disclosure rate. When varying
the portion of H from 10% to 90%, the disclosure rate is ascending. This indicates that the
more H level attributes are specified in the generalization boundary, the more information
would be disclosed in a traditional access control model, which demonstrate our proposed
access model could better avoid information disclosure by specifying generalization bound-
aries. Therefore, in this case, our privacy-aware access model is superior to the traditional
delegation model.
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6.7 RELATED WORK
To date, several approaches have been reported that deal with various aspects of the problem
of high-assurance privacy systems.
The W3Cs Platform for Privacy Preference (P3P) [120] allows web sites to encode their
privacy practice, such as what information is collected, who can access the data for what pur-
poses, and how long the data will be stored by the sites, in a machine-readable format. P3P
enabled browsers can read this privacy policy automatically and compare it to the consumer’s
set of privacy preferences that are specified in a privacy preference language such as a P3P
preference exchange language (APPEL) [121], also designed by the W3C. Even though P3P
provides a standard means for enterprises to make privacy promises to their users, P3P does
not provide any mechanism to ensure that these promises are consistent with the internal data
processing. By contrast, the work in our paper not only provides an effective generalization
strategy to maximize data privacy and usability, but also provides details on how to manage
the valid access process. In particular, we propose a privacy-aware access control model
based on the generalization techniques.
The concept of Hippocratic databases that incorporates privacy protection within rela-
tional database systems was introduced by Agrawal et al. [3]. The proposed architecture
uses privacy metadata, which consists of privacy policies and privacy authorizations stored
in two tables. Byun et al. [19, 18] presented a comprehensive approach for privacy preserv-
ing access control based on the notion of purpose. In the model, purpose information associ-
ated with a given data element specifies the intended use of the data element, and the model
allows multiple purposes to be associated with each data element. The granularity of data
labeling is discussed in detail in [19], and a systematic approach to implement the notion of
access purposes, using roles and role-attributes is presented in [18]. Although these models
do protect the privacy of data providers, they are rigid and do not provide ways to maximize
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the utilization of private information. More specifically, in these models, the access deci-
sion is always binary; i.e., a data access is either allowed or denied as in most conventional
access control models. Different from previous models, the novelty of our approach is that
our model can provide a much finer level of access control as the access decision is based
on the question of “how much information can be allowed for a certain user”, rather than “is
information allowed for a certain user or not”. In other words, every piece of information is
classified into different generalization levels and every user is assigned an authorization to
access the private information.
Previous work on multilevel secure relational databases [50, 85] also provides many
valuable insights for designing a fine-grained secure data model. In a multilevel relational
database system, every piece of information is classified into a security level, and every user
is assigned a security clearance. Based on this access class, the system ensures that each
user gains access to only the data for which s/he has proper clearance, according to the basic
restrictions. Byun and Bertino [20] proposed a new class of access control systems based on
the notion ofmicro-view, which applied the idea of views at the level of the atomic compo-
nents of tuples to an attribute value. However, the model in [20] is not a complete solution
but rather it is aimed to show some of the capabilities. Some technical challenges raised by
their model have been solved in our paper. One of the challenges is to design metrics for
data privacy and data usability. We solve this challenge by introducing the privacy-aware
generalization boundary technique, which can maximize the privacy and utility for both data
providers and data users. Another challenge is concerned with the applicability to general-
purpose access control, which we solve by providing a complete access control model with
the implementation of access control policy. We also discuss the state transition and archi-
tecture of our privacy-aware access control model.
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6.8 SUMMARY
In this chapter, we have considered a generalization boundary technique that can satisfy
the requirements of both data providers and data users. Both privacy and usability of data
items can be achieved when data items are generalized using this technique. Moreover,
we present a privacy-aware access control model, where the trust-based decision policy and
ongoing access control policy combine together to create a secure protection system. Further,
our model provides a much finer level of control as the access control decision is based on
the question of “how much information can be allowed for a certain user”, rather than “is
information allowed for a certain user or not”. The privacy-aware access control model
presented in this section provides an example of multi-level secure relational databases.
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OPTIMAL PRIVACY-AWARE PATH IN
HIPPOCRATIC DATABASES
In this chapter, we present an approach to automatically derive the optimal way of authoriza-
tions needed to achieve a service from enterprise privacy policies. In particular, we organize
purposes into purpose directed graphs through AND/OR decompositions, which support the
delegation of tasks and authorizations when a host of partners participating in the business
service provides different ways to achieve the same service. Further, we allow customers to
express their trust preferences associated with each partner of the business process. Thus, a
weight combining privacy cost and customer trust is given on each arc of the graph in the
form of privacy penalties, and the process for fulfilling a purpose can be customized at run-
time and guarantees minimal privacy cost and maximal customer trust because it was selected
with the criterion of the optimal privacy penalty. Finally, an efficient algorithm is proposed to
find the optimal privacy-aware path in Hippocratic databases. Our work is grounded on the
modeling and analysis of purposes for Hippocratic databases and proposes enhancements to
Hippocratic database systems in order to deal with inter-organizational business processes.
The information in this chapter is based on a published paper [63].
7.1 INTRODUCTION
With the widespread use of information technology in all walks of life, personal information
is being collected, stored and used in various information systems. Achieving privacy preser-
vation has became a major concern. Issues related to privacy have been widely investigated
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and several privacy protecting techniques have been developed. To our best knowledge, the
most well known effort is the W3C’s Platform for Privacy Preference (P3P) [29]. P3P allows
websites to express their privacy policy in a machine readable format so that using a soft-
ware agent, consumers can easily compare the published privacy policies against their pri-
vacy preferences. While P3P provides a mechanism for ensuring that users can be informed
about privacy policies before they release personal information, some other approaches are
proposed [9, 18, 54, 69, 112], where the notion of purpose plays an important role in order
to capture the intended usage of information.
As enterprises collect and maintain increasing amounts of personal data, not only individ-
uals are exposed to greater risks of privacy breaches and identity theft, but many enterprises
and organizations are deeply concerned about privacy issues as well. Many companies, such
as IBM and the Royal Bank Financial Group, use privacy as a brand differentiator [5]. By
demonstrating good privacy practices, many business try to build solid trust with customers,
thereby attracting more customers [89, 13, 15, 39]. Together with the notion of purpose,
current privacy legislation also defines the privacy principles that an information system has
to meet in order to guarantee a customer’s privacy [38, 3, 4, 96]. A mechanism for negotia-
tion is presented by Tumer et al. [96]. Enterprises specify which information is mandatory
for achieving a service and which is optional, while customers specify the type of access for
each part of their personal information.
On the basis of the solution for the exchange between enterprises and customers, Hippo-
cratic databases enforced fine-grained disclosure policies to an architecture at the data level
[3]. In the proposed architecture, enterprises declared the purpose for which the data are
collected, who can receive them, the length of time the data can be retained, and the autho-
rized users who can access them. Hippocratic databases also created a privacy authorization
table shared by all customers, but it does not allow to distinguish which particular method is
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used for fulfilling a service. Moreover, enterprises are able to provide their services in dif-
ferent ways, and each different method may require different data. For example, notification
can be done by email or by mobile phone or by fax. Depending on the different kinds of
methods, customers should provide different personal information. Asking for all personal
information for different service methods as compulsory would clearly violate the principle
of minimal disclosure.
On the server side, a single enterprise usually could not complete all the procedures of
a service by itself, rather a set of collaborating organizations must participate in the service.
Enterprises might need to decompose a generic purpose into more specific sub-purposes
since they are not completely able to fulfill it by themselves, and so they may delegate the
fulfillment of sub-purposes to third parties. It is up to customers to decide on a strategy of
service fulfillment on the basis of their personal feeling of trust for different service com-
ponents. A question that many customers have when interacting with a web server, with an
application, or with an information source, is “Can I trust this entity?”. Different customiza-
tions may require different data for which considerations may vary; there might be different
trust levels for different partners (sub-contractors). The choice of service customization has
significant impact on the privacy of individual customers.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 introduces the motivation of
this chapter based on a running example. Section 7.3 presents some background informa-
tion on Hippocratic database systems.We introduce purpose directed graph with delegation
in Section 7.4 and discuss how to characterize the privacy penalty and efficiently find the
optimal solution in Section 7.5. We provide a brief survey of related work in Section 7.6.
We summary this chapter in Section 7.7.
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7.2 MOTIVATION
We consider the following example throughout the paper.
Example: Ebay is an online seller in Australia and provides an online catalogue to its cus-
tomers who can search for the items they wish to buy. Once customers have decided to
buy goods, Ebay needs to obtain certain personal information from customers to perform
purchase transactions. This information includes name, shipping address, and credit card
number. Ebay views purchase, its ultimate purpose, as a three-step process: credit assess-
ment, delivery, and notification. Credit assessment relies on Credit Card Company (CCC).
Delivery can be done either by a delivery company or the post office, while notification can
be done by email or by mobile phone.
Obviously, Ebay provides many ways to achieve the purchase service and each different
method could require different data. An important principle is that enterprises should dis-
close to customers which data is collected and for what purpose. Also, enterprises should
maintain the minimal personal information necessary to fulfill the purpose for which the
information was collected.
From the customers’ point of view, they do not want to disclose more data than needed
to get the desired service; rather, they want the process that best protects their privacy based
on their preferences. Depending on the method of notification, Ebay needs either an email
address or a mobile phone number. For example, Jimmy, a professor plagued by spam, may
treasure his email address and give away his business mobile phone number. Bob, a doctor
whose mobile phone is always ringing, may have the opposite preference. Therefore, it is up
to customers to decide how to get a service fulfilled on the basis of their personal feeling of
any service customization.
Furthermore, if we consider the delivery service, Ebay could not fulfill the service by
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itself, but rather relies on a delivery company or post office. That means Ebay may outsource
a large part of data processing to third parties participating in a single business process.
However, the more the data is used, the more likely it might be disclosed, since the personal
information is transmitted from one to another. This requires that enterprises maintain the
minimal personal information necessary to fulfill the purpose. Moreover, the partners chosen
by Ebay might also be trusted differently by its potential customers. The burden of choice is
on the human who must decide what to do on the basis of his/her personal feeling of trust of
the enterprises. For instance, Albert may prefer to delivery by a delivery company, since it
is fast; whereas, Bob may chose delivery by post office because it is safe. Different partners
(sub-contractors) chosen for the same purpose may have different trust levels. The choice of
service customization has significant impact on the privacy of individual customers.
If we consider these factors, both the privacy cost and customer’s trust should be consid-
ered as important factors in a privacy security system when enterprises publish comprehen-
sive privacy policies involving hierarchies of purposes, possibly spanning multiple partners.
Formally, it can be stated as follows:
Minimal privacy cost: Is there a way to fulfill the purpose with minimal privacy cost?
Maximal customer’s trust: Is there a way to fulfill the purpose with maximal trust between
enterprises and customers?
Classical privacy-aware database systems such as Hippocratic databases do not consider
these issues. We are interested in solutions that support customers and companies alike,
so that companies can publish comprehensive privacy policies involving multiple service
methods, and possibly delegation of tasks and authorizations. Moreover, the solutions will
allow customers to personalize services based on their own privacy sensitivities and their
trust of partners who might contribute to the requested service.
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7.3 OVERVIEW OF HIPPOCRATIC DATABASES
Hippocratic databases use purpose as a central concept [3]. A purpose describes the rea-
son(s) for data collection and data access, which is stored in the database as a “special”
attribute occurring in every table of the database. This attribute specifies the purpose (rea-
son/goal) for which a piece of information can be used.
For example, Table 7.1 shows the schema of two tables, customer and order, that store
the personal information including purposes. In particular, table customer stores personal
information about customers, and table order stores information about the transactions be-
tween enterprises and their customers. Then, for each purpose and data item stored in the
database, we have:
External-recipients: the actors to whom the data item is disclosed;
Retention-period: the period during which the data item should be maintained;
Authorized-users: the users entitled to access the data item.
Purpose, external recipients, authorized users, and retention period are stored in the
database with respect to the metadata schema defined in Table 7.2. Specifically, the above
information is split into separate tables: external-recipients and retention period are in the
privacy-policies table, while the authorized-users are in the privacy-authorizations table.
The purpose is stored in both of them. The privacy-policies table contains the privacy poli-
cies of the enterprise, while privacy-authorizations table contains the access control policies
that implement the privacy policy and represents the actual disclosure of information. In par-
ticular, privacy-authorizations tables are derived from privacy-policies tables by instantiating
each external recipient with the corresponding users. Therefore, Hippocratic database sys-
tems define one privacy-authorizations table for each privacy-policies table, and these tables
represent what information is actually disclosed.
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table attribute
customer purpose, customer-id, name, address, email, fax-number, credit-card-info
order purpose, customer-id, transaction, book-info, status
Table 7.1: Database schema
table attribute
privacy-polices purpose, table, attribute, fexternal-receiptsg, fretention-periodg
privacy-authorizations purpose, table, attribute, fauthorized-usersg
Table 7.2: Privacy metadata schema
Hippocratic database system is an elegant and simple solution but does not allow for
dynamic situations that could arise with web services and business process softwares. In
such settings, enterprises may provide services in many different ways and may delegate
the execution of parts of the service to third parties. This is indeed the case for a virtual
organization based on a business process for web service where different partners explicitly
integrate their efforts into one process [48].
7.4 PURPOSE DIRECTED GRAPH WITH DELEGATION
Agrawal et al. [3] proposed a structure to split a purpose into multiple purposes and then
store them in the database. Karjoth et al. [54] used a directory-like notation to represent
purpose hierarchies, which loses the logic relation between a purpose and its sub-purposes.
In particular, this notation does not distinguish if a sub-purpose is derived by AND or OR de-
composition [75]. Assuming a purpose p is AND-decomposed into sub-purposes p1; : : : ; pn,
then all of the sub-purposes must be satisfied in order to satisfy p. For example, Ebay AND-
decomposes purchase into delivery, credit assessment, and notification, then all of the three
sub-purposes have to be fulfilled for fulfilling the purchase purpose. However, if a purpose p
is OR-decomposed into sub-purposes p1; : : : ; pn, then only one of the sub-purposes must be
satisfied in order to satisfy p. For instance, Ebay further OR-decomposes delivery into direct
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delivery relying on delivery companies and delivery by post office. In this way, only one of
them could be necessary to fulfill the delivery purpose. In essence, AND-decomposition is
used to define the process for achieving a purpose, while OR-decomposition defines alterna-
tives for achieving a purpose.
Our approach is based on traditional goal analysis [74], and consists of decomposing
purposes into sub-purposes through an AND/OR refinement. The idea is to represent purpose
hierarchies with directed graphs.
Definition 7.1. A purpose directed graph PDG is a pair (P;A), where P is a set of purposes
and A is the set of arcs, each arc represents a hierarchical relation between the purposes.
A purpose directed graph (PDG) can be used to represent goal models in goal-oriented
requirements engineering approaches [17]. For our purposes, they represent the entire set
of alternative ways for delivering a service required by customers. Such representations can
also be used to model the delegations of tasks and authorizations in the security modeling
methodology proposed by Giorgini et al. [42].
An enterprise could provide different methods to achieve a service or rely on different
partners to achieve the same part of the service. In particular, Ebay relies on a delivery com-
pany, Worldwide Express (WWEx), for shipping books. Ebay needs to delegate customer’s
information, such as name and shipping address, to WWEx. In turn, WWEx depends on
local delivery companies for door-to-door delivery. To this end, WWEx delegates customer
information to the local delivery companies LDC1,    , LDCn for door-to-door delivery.
Consequently, different processes can be used to fulfill the required service. To capture this
insight, we introduce the notion of path.
Definition 7.2. Let PDG = (P;A) be a purpose directed graph. A path from v0 to vm is
defined as a sequence W = (v0; a1; v1; :::; am; vm), where ai is an arc from vi 1 to vi for
i = 1; :::;m.
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Figure 7.1: Purpose directed graph
A purpose directed graph PDG is rooted if it contains a vertex v, such that all the vertices
of PDG are reachable from v through a directed path. The vertex v is called a root of PDG.
For example, consider the purpose directed graph depicted in Figure 7.1. Each vertex is
composed of two parts: a purpose identifier and an enterprise needed to fulfill the purpose,
and each of the purposes represents the policies of a single enterprise. The vertex ‘purchase’
is the root of the graph and purchase is the root-level purpose. Essentially, if a path W =
(v0; a1; v1; :::; am; vm) satisfies that v0 is the root purpose and there exists no downward paths
from vm, we say the path is an essential path. An essential path represents a possible process
through which an enterprise can fulfill the root purpose.
The enterprise-wide privacy policies are derived by looking at the Hippocratic database
of each partner involved in the business process and merging them into a single purpose.
Therefore, purposes can be recognized as the outcome of a process of refinements of goals
in security requirements modeling methodologies [41]. The task delegation is indeed the
case of a virtual organization based on a business process for web service where different
partners explicitly integrate their efforts into one process.
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7.5 FINDING OPTIMAL PRIVACY-AWARE PATH
Our goal is to decide which is the essential optimal privacy-aware path to fulfill the root pur-
pose with respect to the customer’s preference. This can be performed through the following
quantitative analysis.
7.5.1 OBJECTIVE CHARACTERIZATION
Since our reference business model is that of virtual organizations, we assume that there will
often be more than one way to deliver a service. Yet, they may differ in an important aspect,
notably they may require different private data items, which incur different privacy costs.
Further, depending on each customer’s individual preferences, the same decomposition path
might have significantly different trust values for different customers. In order to support
quantitative analysis, we need to introduce the notion of privacy penalty.
Definition 7.3. The privacy penalty of an arc a is defined as a pair wa = (; ), where  is
the privacy cost and  is the customer’s trust value on the arc a.
Choice of ; : The privacy penalty pair (; ) on each arc can be pre-defined by asking the
enterprises and customers to specify the level of privacy cost, and the trust they feel about the
sub-suppliers. Since the personal information is transmitted from one to another, this may
increase the danger of the leakage of personal information. Therefore, we use  to depict
the privacy cost. Generally, we assume that there are different trust values based on the cus-
tomer’s personal feeling of the trust on different service customizations. For example, Bob
prefers mobile notification more than email notification because of his personal experience,
so there is a high trust value on mobile notification.
Intuitively, the privacy penalty of a path should consist of two parts: one is the sum of
the privacy cost on each arc and the other is the minimum trust among these arcs.
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Definition 7.4. Let P = (v0; a1; v1;    ; am; vm) be a path in the PDG. Then, the privacy




i=1(i)), where !ai = (i; i),
i = 1; :::;m.
Essentially, a path represents a possible process through which an enterprise can fulfill a
root purpose. For our purpose, we use the sum of the private cost of each arc because we
argue that the more a piece of data is used, the more likely it might be misused. The smaller
the sum is, the less the privacy cost is. Therefore, sum measures are the ones that capture
best one’s intuitions on the cost of privacy. We also use the minimization function on trust
values to get the smallest trust value on this path. The larger the value is, the more the trust is
on this path. Our goal is to decide which is the process with the optimal privacy penalty (i.e.,
the minimal privacy cost and maximal trust value) to fulfill the root purpose with respect to
the user’s preferences. In order to describe the user’s preference, we next introduce a flexible
objective function.
Flexible objective function: If the privacy penalty on the arc a is defined as wa = (; ),
we introduce the following objective function to balance the privacy cost and customer trust
with a preference coefficient  (0    1).
alt(a) =   + (1  )  (7.1)
The choice of parameter  depends on the customer’s preference. If the customer cares
whether data are disclosed at all, then  may be set with a value in the interval 0:5    1.
On the other hand, if the customer stresses more on trust, then  can be set with a value
between 0 and 0.5.
In addition to the objective function, we propose to decompose purposes into sub-purposes
through an AND/OR decomposition. In essence, AND-decomposition is used to define the
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process for achieving a purpose, while OR-decomposition defines alternatives for achieving
a purpose. Normally, the node purpose can be either AND-decomposed or OR-decomposed.
A decomposition arc is either an OR-arc or an AND-arc.
Definition 7.5. Let PDG = (P;A) be a purpose directed graph, for each vertex v 2 P ,
we denote OUT (v) = OUTor(v) [ OUTand(v) as the set of all successors of v, where
OUTor(v) refers to all successors connecting v with OR-arcs, and OUTand(v) stores all
successors connecting v with AND-arcs. Especially, if OUT (v) = ;, we say the vertex v is
a leaf of PDG.
For example, in Figure 7.2 the root purpose r is AND-decomposed into three sub-
purposes: delivery, credit assessment and notification, thenOUT (r) = OUTand(r) = fdelivery,
credit assessment and notificationg. Further, considering the node v with purpose ‘mobile
notification’, since OUT (v) = ;, then the node ‘mobile notification’ is a leaf of the purpose
directed graph.
7.5.2 THE ALGORITHM
In this section, we present efficient algorithms to track the optimal path that the enterprises
need to fulfill a purpose. Before introducing the algorithm, the following lemma states the
optimal substructure property of the privacy-aware paths, which is the theoretical foundation
for our core algorithms.
LEMMA 7.1: Given a purpose directed graph PDG = (P;A)with privacy penalty function
! : A ! R, let P = (v1; v2;    ; vk) be a path with optimal privacy penalty from vertex v1
to vertex vk, and for any i and j (1  i  j  k), let Pij = (vi; vi+1;    ; vj) be the subpath
of P from vertex vi to vj . Then, Pij is a path with optimal privacy penalty from vi to vj .
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Algorithm 1: optimal path(PDG;OR r)
Input: a purpose directed graph PDG with OR-decompoded root r.
Output: The optimal path D
1. Contract each vertex v with all its successors in OUTand(v) to
the compound vertex vc
2. Transfer PDG into PDG
3. p = optimal path(PDG)
4. If p contains compound vertex(vertices),
5. expand the compound vertex(vertices) on p to p,
6. D = p
7. else
8. D = p
PROOF: If we decompose path P into v1 P1i ! vi Pij ! vj Pjk ! vk, then we have that !P =
!P1i + !Pij + !Pjk . Now, assume that there is another path P 0ij from vi to vj with a lower
privacy penalty, i.e. !P 0ij < !Pij . Then, v1
P1i ! vi
P 0ij ! vj Pjk ! vk is a path from v1 to vk
whose privacy penalty is less than !P , which contradicts the assumption that P is the path
with optimal privacy penalty from v1 to vk. 
Next, we analyze two situations in finding the optimal privacy-aware path.
Case 1: if the root purpose is OR-decomposed, the algorithm consists of following steps:
 To contract each vertex v with all its successors in OUTand(v) to a compound vertex vc;
suppose OUTand(v) = fv1;    ; vkg, we define cost[vc] =
Pk
i=1 (v; vi), trust[vc] =
minki=1 (v; vi);
 To transfer the purpose directed graph PDG into PDG with no AND-arcs and find the
optimal path p using function optimal path(PDG);
 If the optimal path of PDG contains a compound vertex (or vertices), then expand the
compound vertex (or vertices) on p to become the optimal solution of PDG.
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function: optimal path(PDG):
Input: PDG with root purpose r and leaves v1; : : : ; vk, pre-defined
privacy cost and trust function (; ), (; ), and
preference coefficient 0    1
0 for each vertex v (not a compound vertex) in PDG:
1 cost[v] := 0
2 trust[v] :=1
3 for each leaf vi (i = 1;    ; k)
4 Sum(vi) := 0, previous[vi] := fvig
5 while r =2 predecessor[vi] = fui1 ;    ; uisg
6 f
7 for each uij (1  j  s)
8 cost(uij ; vi) := cost[vi] + cost[uij ] + (uij ; vi)
9 trust(uij ; vi) := minftrust[vi]; trust[uij ]; (uij ; vi)g
10 alt(uij ; vi) :=   cost(uij ; vi) + (1  ) trust(uij ; vi)
11 if   0:5 /* prefer cost */
12 let alt(uim ; vi) = min
s
j=1alt(uij ; vi)
13 previous[vi] := previous[vi] [ fuimg
14 Sum(vi) := Sum(vi) + alt(uim ; vi)
15 vi := umi
16 if  < 0:5 /* prefer trust */
17 let alt(uim ; vi) = maxsj=1alt(uij ; vi)
28 previous[vi] := previous[vi] [ fuimg
29 Sum(vi) := Sum(vi) + alt(uim ; vi)
20 vi := umi
21 g
22 /*end while and all paths from the leaf to the root are found*/
23 if   0:5
24 assume Sum(vt) = minki=1Sum(vi); (1  t  k)
25 output previous[vt]
26 if  < 0:5
27 assume Sum(vt) = maxki=1Sum(vi); (1  t  k)
28 output previous[vt]
29 end function
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Figure 7.2: sub PDG in Purpose directed graph
In function optimal path(PDG), (u; v) represents the privacy cost between the two nodes
u and v, and (u; v) refers to the trust value on the arc (u; v). For each leaf vertex, Sum
function is used to track the distance between the leaf and the root, while predecessor[]
records all predecessor vertices of the leaf, and previous[] records the vertices on the optimal
path from the leaf to the root. alt on line 10 is the objective function with the preference
coefficient . If   0:5, it means customers prefer more on privacy protection, in which
case the minimal objective value is needed depending on the minimization function; while if
 < 0:5, it means customers prefer more on trust, then the maximal objective value is needed
depending on the maximization procedure.
Case 2: if the root purpose is AND-decomposed, in order to design efficient algorithms to
determine the process by which a service can be delivered with optimal privacy penalties,
we need the definition of a sub-purpose directed graph.
Definition 7.6. Let PDG = (P;A) be a purpose directed graph, if the root purpose r is
AND-decomposed into several sub-purposes, then each sub-purpose with all its descendants
form a sub-purpose directed graph of PDG, and we denote it by sub PDG. Essentially, if
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Algorithm 2: optimal path(PDG;AND r)
Input: A purpose directed graph PDG with AND-decomposed root
Output: The optimal path D
1. decompose PDG into several sub PDG
2. for each sub PDG with root r
3. if the root r is OR-decomposed in sub PDG
4. run algorithm optimal path(sub PDG;OR r)
5. output por = optimal path(sub PDG)
6. if the root r is AND-decomposed in sub PDG
7. further decompose the sub PDG into several sub (sub PDG)s
2. for each sub (sub PDG) with root r0
8. run algorithm optimal path(sub (sub PDG); OR r0)
9. output pand = optimal path(sub PDG)
10. D = ([por) [ ([pand)
the root of the sub PDG is further AND-decomposed into several sub-purposes, then each
sub-purpose with all its descendants form a sub-purpose directed graph of sub PDG, which
is also a sub-sub-purpose directed graph of PDG, and we denote it by sub (sub PDG).
For example, in Figure 7.2 Ebay AND-decomposes purpose purchase into three sub-
purposes: delivery, credit assessment and notification. According to the definition of the
sub-purpose directed graph, the purpose delivery with all its decedents consists of a sub-
purpose directed graph. The same situation applies to the other two sub-purposes, so there
are three sub-purpose directed graphs as in Figure 7.2 (circled in broken line). Since in each
sub-purpose directed graph, the root is further OR-decomposed, there is no sub-sub-purpose
directed graph in Figure 7.2.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the root of each sub (sub PDG) is OR-
decomposed. In this case, the algorithm consists of following steps:
 To decompose the purpose directed graph PDG into several sub-purpose directed graphs.
 For each sub-purpose directed graph sub PDG with root purpose r,
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 if the root purpose r is OR-decomposed, run algorithm optimal path(sub PDG; OR r)
to find the optimal path in sub PDG;
 if the root purpose r is AND-decomposed, further decompose the sub PDG into several
sub-sub-purpose directed graphs, then run algorithm optimal path
(sub (sub PDG); OR r0) to find the optimal path in each sub (sub PDG) with root
r0. Combine all the optimal paths of each sub (sub PDG) into the optimal solution of
sub PDG.
 To combine all the optimal paths of each sub PDG into the optimal solution of PDG.
In Algorithm 2, por refers to the optimal path of sub PDGwith an OR-decomposed root,
while pand refers to the optimal path of sub PDG with an AND-decomposed root.
Algorithm complexity: The time complexity of the two algorithms occurs mainly in the op-
eration of function optimal path(), and the main computation cost of the function optimal path()
is spent on finding the vertices of the optimal privacy-aware path from each leaf vertex to
the root purpose in PDG. If we take advantage of the vertices being numbered from 1 to
jP j, for each leaf vertex, the effort for finding such an optimal path can be evaluated as
jP j+ jP   1j+   +1 = jP j(jP j+1)
2
, and there are at most jP j   1 leaf vertices, which makes
the total execution time of jP j(jP j+1)(jP j 1)
2
. So the time complexity for both algorithms are in
O(jP j3).
Example: Albert wants to buy some books. He prefers to receive books by delivery com-
panies because it is fast. So, he defines his trust to WWEx higher than to the Post Office.
Further, he prefers mobile notification more than email notification because of his personal
experience. Thus, there is a higher trust value on mobile notification. The trust value de-
scribed in Table 7.3 summarizes Albert’s preferences and the privacy cost represents the
online seller Ebay’s default value to initiate the business process. Considering the privacy
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Table 7.3: Albert’s personal preferences
cost defined by Ebay, the preference coefficient  is set to 0.6, which means Albert places
more importance on the privacy cost.
According to our algorithms, the first step is to AND-decompose the purchase purpose
into sub-purposes: delivery, credit assessment and notification. Second, we need to find the
optimal path in each sub-purpose directed graph. For example, in the sub-purpose directed
graph with the root delivery purpose, there are three ways to fulfill the root purpose. Since
Albert’s preference coefficient value is 0:6 > 0:5, then the minimal objective value is needed.
Based on the different privacy cost and trust value on each path, the optimal path is “delivery
! delivery by post”. The same method can be applied to find the optimal paths in other
sub-purpose directed graphs derived by credit assessment and notification purposes. Finally,
combine all the optimal paths of each sub-purpose directed graph into the optimal solution
for the purchase purpose highlighted in Figure 7.3 and it shows efficient balance between the
privacy cost and the customer’s trust.
7.6 RELATED WORK
Our work is related to several topics in the area of privacy and security for data management,
namely privacy policy specification, privacy-preserving data management systems and mul-
tilevel secure database systems. We now briefly survey the most relevant approaches in these
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Figure 7.3: Optimal privacy-aware path
areas and point out the differences of our work with respect to these approaches.
The W3C Platform for Privacy Preference (P3P) [120] allows web sites to encode their
privacy practice, such as what information is collected, who can access the data for what pur-
poses, and how long the data will be stored by the sites, in a machine-readable format. P3P
enabled browsers can read this privacy policy automatically and compare it to the consumer
set of privacy preferences which are specified in a privacy preference language such as a P3P
preference exchange language (APPEL) [29], also designed by the W3C. Even though P3P
provides a standard means for enterprises to make privacy promises to their users, P3P does
not provide any mechanism to ensure that these promises are consistent with the internal data
processing. By contrast, the work in our paper provides an effective strategy to maximize
privacy protection. Further, we allow customers to express their trust preferences associated
with each partner of the business process in order to achieve maximal customer trust.
Byun et al. presented a comprehensive approach for privacy preserving access control
based on the notion of purpose [19, 18]. In the model, purpose information associated with
a given data element specifies the intended use of the data element, and the model allows
multiple purposes to be associated with each data element. The granularity of data labeling
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is discussed in detail in [19], and a systematic approach to implement the notion of access
purposes, using roles and role-attributes is presented in [18]. Similar to our approach, they
introduce purpose hierarchies in order to reason on access control. Their hierarchies are
based on the principles of generalization and specification and are not expressive enough to
support complex strategies defined by enterprises. However, we organize purposes into pur-
pose directed graph through AND/OR decomposition, which supports the delegation of tasks
and authorizations when a host of partners participating in the business process provides dif-
ferent ways to achieve the same service. We also present an efficient method to automatically
derive the optimal way of authorizations needed to achieve a service from enterprise privacy
policies.
The concept of Hippocratic databases, incorporating privacy protection within relational
database systems, was introduced by Agrawal et al. [3]. The proposed architecture uses
privacy metadata, which consist of privacy policies and privacy authorizations stored in two
tables. LeFevre et al. [4] enhance Hippocratic databases with mechanisms for enforcing
queries to respect privacy policies stated by an enterprise and customer preferences. In
essence, they propose to enforce the minimal disclosure principle by providing mechanisms
to data owners that control as who can access their personal data and for which purpose. Al-
though the work on Hippocratic databases [3, 4] is closely related to ours, our approach has
some notable differences. First, we introduce more sophisticated concepts of purpose, i.e.,
purposes are organized in a purpose directed graph through AND/OR decomposition. The
second difference is that Hippocratic databases does not allow to distinguish which particu-
lar method is used; whereas, we discuss the situations that could arise with web services and
business process software. Third, we provide an efficient method to automatically derive the
optimal way of authorizations needed to achieve a service from enterprise privacy policies.
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7.7 SUMMARY
In this chapter, we analyze the purposes behind the design of Hippocratic database systems,
and organize them in hierarchal manner through AND/OR decomposition. We apply the
purpose directed graph to characterize the ways the enterprise needs to achieve a service
which may rely on many different partners. Specially, the selection of the partners and the
identification of a particular plan to fulfill a purpose is driven by the customer’s preferences.
We use a goal-oriented approach to analyze the privacy policies of the enterprises involved in
a business process, in which one can determine the minimum disclosure of data for fulfilling
the root purpose with respect to the customer’s maximum trust. On the basis of the purpose
directed graph derived through a goal refinement process, we provide efficient algorithms to
determine the optimal privacy-aware path for achieving a service. This allows the automatic
derive action of access control policies for an inter-organizational business process from the
collection of privacy policies associated with different participating enterprises.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
This chapter lists the contributions of this dissertation and provides directions for future
work.
8.1 CONCLUSION
In this thesis we provided new authorization allocation algorithms for RBAC along with
mobility based on relational algebra operations. In a system where there are hundreds of
permissions and thousands of roles, it is very difficult to maintain consistency when using
RBAC management. Especially, conflicts may arise when granting more than one permis-
sion as mobile or immobile members to a role in the permission-role assignment. We believe
the approaches proposed in this thesis could automatically check the conflicts and help allo-
cates permissions without compromising security. We also investigate how to revoke mobile
or immobile permissions from a role. Even in the usage control model (UCON), less at-
tention was put into discussing constraints associated with authorizations, obligations and
conditions. Constraints in UCON are one of the most imponents that have been involved in
the principle motivations of usage analysis and design. In this thesis, we provide a tool to
precisely describe constraints and give out a formalized specification of usage control mod-
els. The flexibility and expressive capability of the specified UCON model are also show in
this thesis.
In access control systems, managing users, permissions, roles and their interrelationships
is a vital challenge. RBAC allows us to model security from the perspective of the delegation
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of authority. The basic idea behind delegation is that some active entity in a system delegates
authority to another active entity to carry out some functions on behalf of the former. Differ-
ent delegation models are proposed, however, these models could not deal with the problem
when delegating a collection of permissions to others. We proposed a flexible ability-based
delegation model and analyzed the delegation framework, including delegating authorization
and revocation with constraints. In an open environment, the entities are customarily alien
to each other. When entering into a delegation, the delegator is entering into an uncertain
interaction in which there is a risk of failure due to the delegation decisions. Therefore, the
choice of the cooperative partner plays an important role in determining whether the delega-
tion would success or not. We proposed a multi-level delegation model with trust manage-
ment, where both delegation tasks and trust are organized into three levels. The delegation
task levels are classified according to the information sensitivity, while, the trust levels com-
bine reliability trust and future trust together to indicate to what extent a delegatee is reliable
or trustworthy. The proposed multi-level delegation model allows a delegatee in a higher
trust level to be assigned with a higher level of task. The experimental studies confirm the
advantages of our model in terms of accurate prediction and sensitive information protection.
With the widespread use of information technology in all walks of life, privacy issues are
exacerbated by the Internet. Traditional access control models can not help in privacy pro-
tection any more. We believe a new generation of access control models that could maximize
data utility while minimizing disclosure of privacy is needed. In this thesis we proposed a
privacy-aware access control model with generalization boundaries to balance privacy and
information utility. We formalized authorizations with specific purposes and generalization
levels and discussed how to manage a secure protection system in two stages. More specif-
ically, a trust-based decision policy is proposed to handle access security with regard to the
requester’s trust at the first stage, and an ongoing access control policy is created to han-
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dle the access security with regard to the retention period and generalization level at the
second stage. Although Hippocratic databases enforced fine-grained disclosure policies by
adopting the notion of purpose, the issues such as purpose hierarchies, task delegations and
minimal privacy cost are missing from the proposed mechanism. In this thesis, we organized
purposes into purpose directed graphs through AND/OR decomposition to characterize the
ways the enterprise needs to achieve a service. We use a goal-oriented approach to ana-
lyze the privacy policies of the enterprises involved in a business process, in which one can
determine the minimum disclosure of data for fulfilling the root purpose with respect to a
customer’s maximum trust. We further provide efficient algorithms to determine the opti-
mal privacy-aware path for achieving a service, which allows to automatically derive access
control policies for an inter-organizational business process from the collection of privacy
policies associated with different participating enterprises.
8.2 FUTURE WORK
Based on the research work in this dissertation, we propose the following future research
directions and issues:
 In this thesis we discussed the advanced permission-role relationship in RBAC and pro-
vided a formal language for specifying UCON models. Both access control and usage
control contribute to security techniques for knowledge management. To build more ef-
ficient knowledge management system, further investigation into RBAC and UCON is
needed as part of our future research work. We plan to provide secure strategies, pro-
cesses, and metrics in our next research. Metrics must include support for security-related
information. Processes must include secure operations. Strategies must include security
strategies.
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 In this thesis we extended the delegation model to satisfy ability-based delegation for
groups of users. Moreover, we proposed multi-level delegation with trust management
for multi-agent systems. This work opened up several directions for our future research.
First, since delegation operations could temporarily change the access control state so
as to allow an agent to use another agent’s access privileges, colluding users may abuse
the delegation support of access control systems to circumvent security policies, such as
separation of duty. We intend to consider an enhanced form of delegation in order to avoid
collusion in our future work. Second, the revocation of delegation has not discussed much
in this thesis. It would be interesting to develop a revocation model to protect security
under our multi-level delegation model.
 In this thesis we proposed a privacy aware access control model, which provided efficient
generalization strategies for the preserving of privacy, but much more work still remains to
be done. Future work includes devising a high level language in which privacy specifica-
tions can be expressed precisely. We also plan to extend our model to cope with complex
query processing. We will introduce queries with join, sub-queries or aggregations into
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